The Iran Question seems to never go away.  It was at the forefront of policy issues facing the waning Bush administration in early 2007.  In this term paper for a Rice foreign policy class, I explore the U.S.’s stance towards Iran while also analyzing an expected utility model.  SAJ – 

Bruce Bueno De Mesquita’s expected utility model has proven its value as a tool that can make reliable forecasts on a broad range of policy issues.  Since adapting the model from economics to the field of political science in 1981, Bueno de Mesquita along with other eminent political scientists have expounded upon and refined the theory to the extent that it has accurately predicted policy decisions in events ranging from the return of Hong Kong to the Peoples Republic of China[1] to the outcome of the Cold War[2] to the next leader of post Khomeini Iran[3].  Given the demonstrated robustness and comprehensiveness of the theory, I will conduct a simplified application to one of the most pressing policy issues currently facing the United States today—how to properly handle relations with Iran given its recent desire to obtain nuclear weapons and also its demonstrated influence over the current chaos in Iraq.  By identifying the key stakeholders, their relative power within the policy making institutions, and their salience to the topic, I will make a forecast as to what the U.S.’s policy towards Iran will be in the short term, over the next six months. 

Introduction of The Expected Utility Model

            Before Bruce Bueno De Mesquita’s publication of The War Trap in 1981, political scientists lacked the tools to reliably make policy forecasts.  The expected utility model introduced in the War Trap has since provided the theoretical foundation to accurately predict a wide range of policy issues[4].  The expected utility model is based on a set of premises[5]:

• Decision makers order their alternatives along sets of transitive preferences where transitive preferences are defined such that if A is preferred to B, and B is preferred to C, then A is also preferred to C.
• Decision makers are able to determine their expected utility from certain factors
• Decision makers act based on the probability of obtaining a certain outcome and utility
• Being rational, decision makers choose the strategy with the highest associated utility based on the information available to them at the time of making the decision

Given these premises, the higher a decision maker’s expected utility, the more he is willing to do to obtain that utility.   This theory, created by economists to determine a consumer’s preferences, relies on very specific, quantifiable data not normally available and applicable by political scientists.  Therefore, political scientists must determine:

1. The stakeholders associated with forming the policy decision in question
2. The relative power (political, economic, military, etc.) associated with each stakeholder
3. The policy preferences of each stakeholder
4. The degree of importance, salience, of the issue to each stakeholder[6]

This data is often difficult to obtain and is usually solicited from experts in the field. These experts look at facets of internal dialog within a group to determine that group’s preferences, which Bueno de Mesquita bases on the Median Voter Theorem[7].  This theorem states that if a group of stakeholders faces a range of policy options, and each member of the group prefers a single, defined option, then the outcome selected will reflect the preferences of the median voter because policy makers, needing more support than from their base, want to garner the support of these voters to form a majority consensus.  Combining the preferences of the voters on the extremes of the range of the policy options, the median voters, and the idea that all voters are willing to bargain in order to obtain something versus nothing at all, the model is then able to yield fairly precise forecasts.  Therefore, given the stakeholders, their policy preference, their relative power, and salience, combined with the Median Voter Theorem, the expected utility model is able to make fairly reliable policy forecasts.  

Framing U.S. Policy Towards Iran

            In 1953 The United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) undertook operation TP-AJAX in what would become the agency’s first successful effort at overthrowing a foreign, sovereign government.  Encouraged by the British, who were angered by the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951 by Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq’s administration, the CIA conspired to install a pro-western government in what the agency believed would aid in stemming the growth of communism.  Although the plot almost disintegrated the night before the coup took place, the United States and its western allies succeeded in empowering Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi as the Iranian dictator.  The Shah reigned for over a quarter of a century before the Islamic Revolution ousted his government and led to the return of Ayatollah Khomeini as supreme leader[8].  The Ayatollah was not sympathetic to western interests and made this policy very clear when he did nothing to stop students from storming the U.S. embassy in 1979.  The hostages were released after 444 days, but the embassy has never reopened and American-Iranian relations have never normalized[9]. 

Because of the powerful memory created by this brazen act against a U.S. interest or because of stories propagated by various anti-Iranian and/or humanitarian groups, Iran consistently ranks as one of America’s least favorite countries[10].  In 2002 U.S. President George W. Bush highlighted the state of poor relations between the two nations when he branded the Islamic state as a member of the “Axis of Evil” in his annual address to the nation[11].  As basis for this claim or out of fear for a repeat of the 1953 coup, the Iranians began to develop the capability to enrich uranium that could ultimately be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.  Through the reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [12] and the anti-Semitic claims of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran proclaimed its rising status as a regional hegemony to the Israelis, to the Europeans, and certainly to the Americans who were occupying themselves with Iran’s neighbors Afghanistan and Iraq[13]. 

The U.S. led invasion of Iraq toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime and as a result Iran became the region’s most powerful nation thanks to the forces of one of its greatest enemies.   Since the fall of Saddam’s regime, the U.S. military and the new pro-western government have failed to create stability in the country in the longest U.S. military engagement since Vietnam.  Increasingly, the Iranians are seen as having a more powerful position than ever imagined.  The Iranians have strong ties to the new Iraqi political elite, have deep intelligence networks throughout the nation, and have the resources and desire to provide the funding and support to those organizations that support its interests.  The result of all of these connections is that Iran is believed to have the greatly desired ability to make significant inroads in the stabilization of Iraq.  This new power gives it unprecedented bargaining leverage with the U.S., which could cause President Bush to reconsider negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program and other extremely important issues to the Iranians[14].  With so many saliant and related policy issues vying for the U.S.’s attention with regard to Iran, the current administration must increasingly take a firm position in its policy towards Iran in order to avoid continual failure in Iraq, a nuclear weapon state in Iran, and the possibility of full blown chaos in the Middle East region. 

The Stakeholders, Their Positions, Power, and Salience

See appendix for chart and diagram.

            U.S. President George W. Bush, as Commander and Chief of the United States Armed Forces and President of the United States and endowed with the powers associated with that office, is the single, most powerful stakeholder in determining the U.S.’s policy towards Iran.  Although Bush’s official policy has been to pursue a diplomatic solution in regard to Iran’s nuclear program, he has also clearly stated that “all options are on the table” meaning that he will not rule out the use of military force to destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities[15].  To back up this point, Bush has authorized clandestine activities in order to identify targets for a comprehensive air campaign[16]. However, even devout neo-conservatives, close to the administration, find it very unlikely that Bush would actually pursue a military option[17].  In support of this theory, Bush has recently softened his rhetoric, even hinting that the U.S. may not have any other feasible choice but to talk with Iran[18].  Furthermore, following the publication of the Iraq Study Group’s report on December 6, 2006, Bush has been less vocal with regards to military options and has hinted at the possibility of resuming negotiations with Iran with regard to both its nuclear ambitions and its ability to play a stronger role in the stabilization of Iraq.  However, Bush’s statements have not gone so far to suggest that the U.S. will or should actively pursue talks regardless of whether Iran stops enriching uranium.  Instead, Bush maintains that Iran must stop enriching uranium as a prerequisite to any talks on any subjects:

            We have made it clear to the Iranians that there is a possible change in U.S. policy, a

policy that’s been in place for 27 years…And that is that, if they would like to engage the

United States, that they’ve got to verifiably suspend their [uranium] enrichment program[19].

While Bush has in the past hinted at the possibility of military intervention, current circumstances make this policy option very difficult for him. With regards to the salience of the Iran issue, the current crisis in Iraq is the dominant foreign policy issue with which Bush is currently juggling in conjunction with the relatively smaller issues of Iran, North Korea, and Afghanistan just to name a few.  Furthermore, given the Republican Party’s recent loss in the mid-term elections, and the subsequence resurgent importance of domestic issues, Bush is not able to devote as much energy to the Iran policy situation as much as some other stakeholders[20]. 

            U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney is by virtue of office, and in the past as a result of his close relationship with the Republican Party and the Bush family, the second most powerful person in the U.S. administration.  However, with the U.S. Supreme Court ruling against him, embarrassing news stories having their impact, and the decline in popularity of the policies he once so visibly espoused, Cheney has seen his power beginning to wane with current White House Chief of Staff Josh Bolton even going so far as to say that the President should hear more opinions[21].  In line with becoming accustomed to his new position, Dick Cheney has not been so visible or vocal on a position towards Iran but has merely only restated Bush’s stance of “keeping all options on the table.[22]”  However, sources close to the Vice President report that Cheney and his closest advisors on the Middle East, including neo-conservative David Wurmser, have advocated regime change in Iran[23].  Furthermore, like Bush and in line with dampened  power, Cheney is not able to dedicate a great deal of resource towards his hawkish view on Iran. 

            U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice is by her position and by her increasingly powerful and positive reputation a strong force within the Republican administration.  Being a member of the administration has two major prospects for Rice.  First, she must publicly maintain the administration’s official line of remaining open to all options.  However, as Secretary of State, she also has the second option of maintaining and pursuing her own policy objectives.  Since her appointment in 2005 as Bush’s second Secretary of State, she has solidified her reputation as someone who demands strong evidence and always puts her diplomatic reputation first before committing to a policy[24].  To this extent, she has pressured the Bush administration to not rush policy without lack of verifiable evidence on which to base sound policy.  Rice’s salience remains in line with the rest of the Bush administration. 

            Robert Gates as Donald Rumsfeld’s replacement as U.S. Secretary of Defense has a tough job ahead of him.  The fact that he is replacing a man who was asked to leave following what was seemingly a referendum on the Bush Administration’s handling of the conflict in Iraq, it follows that his foreign policy would be a bit less hawkish than his predecessor.  In a 2004 report to the Council on Foreign Relations, Gates argued that the U.S.’s failure to openly talk with the Iranian government was self-defeating[25].  He reaffirmed this opinion during his confirmation hearing with the Senate Armed Services Committee:

Senator Byrd, I think that military action against Iran would be an absolute last resort; that any problems that we have with Iran, our first option should be diplomacy and working with our allies to try and deal with the problems that Iran is posing to us. I think that we have seen in Iraq that once war is unleashed, it becomes unpredictable. And I think that the consequences of a conflict–a military conflict with Iran could be quite dramatic. And therefore, I would counsel against military action, except as a last resort and if we felt that our vital interests were threatened[26].

In addition to his more diplomatic approach towards Iran, Gates may also have a slightly higher salience than the other members of the Bush administration in that his appointment is the result of a need for fresh opinions given the failure of the old rhetoric.

            The Iraq Study Group, co-chaired by former Secretary of State James A. Baker, III and former congressman Lee H. Hamilton, was formed in March of 2006 at the behest of the U.S. Congress.  The bipartisan group was charged with the task of providing fresh insight into the situation in and surrounding the current chaos in Iraq[27].  The group wields a relatively large amount of power because of its nature as a special appointment by the Congress as a way to seek out new policy directions and because of its influential members.  However, while the group’s report could offer the U.S. administration a way to substantially change its policy towards Iran without losing face, the administration has been clear to note that the group’s findings will not dictate policy, but that the administration will merely “seriously consider” the group’s report[28].  The group’s findings, released on December 6, 2006, recommend leaving the topic of Iran’s nuclear aspirations to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) but to use “diplomatic efforts” to engage Iran on the subject of its ability and will to aid in the stabilization of Iraq[29].  Although the recommendation by the group to engage Iran in diplomatic talks was highly publicized by the press, the fact that the group was formed to produce findings specifically on Iraq and that only two pages of a more than 140 page report are dedicated specifically to Iran, the group’s saliency is relatively low. 

            The U.S. Democratic Party is the last major stakeholder within the United States with considerable influence over the nation’s policy towards Iran.  While the position of the Bush Administration and the Republican Party that it leads has not been so straightforward with its stance with Iran, the Democrats have also been vague especially with the crucial mid-term elections in November of 2006.  However, it is possible to identify at least two statement based positions and to discern a third.  I have therefore divided the Democratic Party into three entities.  Some Senate Democrats, keen to demonstrate their strong stance on national security, have taken a strong stance in favor of stark sanctions against Iran without making an active attempt to first engage in meaningful dialogue.  Hillary Clinton, Joseph Lieberman, and Evan Bayh personify this first faction.  Commenting on the Iraq Study Group’s findings, Joseph Lieberman said that he is “skeptical that it’s realistic to think that Iran wants to help the United States succeed in Iraq.[30]”  Senator Barack Obama has even gone so far to say that he would suggest surgical strikes against Iran should it not meet U.S. demands to stop its nuclear research program[31].   Given the high profile of many of these Senate Democrats, their political ambitions, and the close alignment in policy with that of the Bush Administration, they are relatively the most powerful group among the Democrats. 

            Not all Democrats have political ambitions that would lead them to the nation’s top job, and their statements about Iran have therefore been less hawkish.  For example, Jim Web, Democratic Senator from Maine also argues against the use of force but for firm resolve:

If we simply attacked Iran right now, we would face the reality that there are 135,000 Americans sitting in Iraq who could absorb a counter-blow.  Iran also could shut down the Straits of Hormuz very quickly, which would have serious impact, especially on Japan…Common sense.  Multilateral negotiations.  Firmness but not stupidity or false bravado[32].

Finally, some Democrats like Senator Joseph Biden portend to be more sympathetic to the Iranian desire to build a nuclear program.  Biden believes that even if Iran were a democracy, a relative friend to the United States, it would want nuclear security.  To this extent, he advocates some sort of non-aggression pact with Iran[33].  The group of Democrats, as personified by Jim Web, is not as vocal or powerful as the likes of Hillary Clinton and Joseph Lieberman.  Furthermore, Joseph Biden’s stance is certainly not the majority opinion among Democrats and therefore enjoys the least amount of power in the party.  Finally, the salience level for the entire Democratic party is in line with the Republicans as personified by the Bush administration.  Given the disparate directions that the country is being pulled in foreign policy wise, the Democrats are also unable to expend a great deal of political capital in arranging a deal with Iran. 

            Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is the highest elected official in Iran and the man who has been the most vocal about his nation’s nuclear program and geopolitical ambitions.  Although he is not a member of the U.S. government, as leader of the target nation, he has considerable power to influence the direction of the U.S. policy based on his rhetoric and actions.  To date, his signals have been mixed.  For example, his anti-Semitic stance as epitomized by hosting a conference in Tehran over whether the Holocaust really happened or not[34] does little to create friendly relations with the United States and its closest and understandably most rattled ally in the region, Israel.  However, while Iran is feeling pretty cocky given the poor state of affairs for the U.S. in the region, it also has a lot to gain by pursuing talks with the U.S.  For example, for the past 27 years, and increasingly so, the understood, default U.S. policy towards Iran has favored regime change.  By securing open negotiations with the U.S., Iran could seek to change this U.S. policy and thereby have the world’s only hegemony recognize it as the region’s only hegemony.  Furthermore, by assisting the U.S. in the stabilization of Iraq, Iran can avoid instability in the region.  An unstable neighbor would be bad for Iran because it could lead to unrest within its own minority populations.  Additionally, supporting the new Iraqi government increases Iran’s chances of also building an Iran-friendly, Shia-led, government, a desirable goal given the disastrous outcome of the Iran-Iraq War.  Finally, by pursuing negotiations geared towards ways in which his country can assist in Iraq, Ahmadinejad could gain assurances that Iran’s nuclear program would not be prematurely terminated and the possibility of normalized relations with the West, which could lead to even better economic conditions in the already oil-rich nation[35].  While it may be hard for Ahmadinejad to convince Washington to begin talks that would yield it some success on the nuclear front, the deteriorating situation in Iraq might be the leverage that Ahmadinejad needs.  The U.S. for its part definitely has sufficient power in the U.N. to stall or halt sanctions in the Security Council given that it is one of the primary backers of harsh, punitive measures[36].  With regards to saliency, there is no other foreign policy issue facing Iran that is more important than the conflict over its nuclear ambitions with the West.

            British Prime Minister Tony Blair and the United Kingdom have been the U.S.’s greatest ally ever since WWII.  This close relationship has only been solidified by the U.K.’s active participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom, which led to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime.  With such strong, demonstrated support for previous and existing American policy, the U.K., led by Tony Blair, has unparalleled access and influence with regard to U.S. foreign policy.  However, its staunch support for past U.S. led policies does not mean that it is blind to trouble when it sees it.  Furthermore, the Prime Minister, looking to end his long tenure at the helm on a high note, is increasingly worried about being perceived as only on the receiving end on a one way relationship with the U.S[37].  To this extent, given the deteriorating situation in Iraq and increasing unpopularity of the conflict at home, Tony Blair is advising President Bush to begin negotiations with Iran[38].  Blair is especially keen to seize upon the opportunity granted by the Iraq Study Group’s report to recommend exploring new avenues toward solving especially the crisis in Iraq.  Although the U.K. is also severely entangled with the crisis in Iraq, it is not as mired by North Korea or Afghanistan to the extent that the U.S. is.  Furthermore, given Tony Blair’s active effort beginning in November to start pushing for talks with Iran over Iraq, and even the U.S.’s insistence that Europe take a leading role in sanctions over Iran’s nuclear program, the Prime Minister has demonstrated a relatively higher salience on the issue than his U.S. counterpart[39]. 

            That Israel enjoys a sort of special alliance with the United States is no secret.  From foreign aid to military cooperation, Israel’s relationship and needs are felt very deeply within Washington[40].  Israel is rightfully very concerned about Iran, whether it is nuclear armed or not.  Iran wields great power and influence with Hezbollah in Palestine, and Israel’s loss to Hezbollah in summer of 2006 highlighted the strength of that movement.  More poignantly, Israel is not pleased by the rather egregious anti-Semitic comments on behalf of Iranian authorities.  With comments like Israel should be “wiped off of the map,” Israel has a rightful reason to be worried about Iran[41].  In light of Iran’s increasing influence and vociferous dialect directed towards Israel, Israel’s government is in favor of a policy that eliminates the possibility of Iran becoming a nuclear-armed state.  In 1981 Israel launched a successful operation against Iraq to destroy its nuclear reactor facility, and it has not ruled out such unilateral action against Iran.  While it would most likely not act without U.S. support, the pressure is on the U.S. to come up with a suitable policy that does not pressure Israel into the position where it feels like it has no option other than a military strike[42].   It can be reasonably assumed that the issue of U.S. policy towards Iran is of very high salience to Israel. 

            Russia and China are two countries that do not usually have a significant, direct impact on U.S. foreign policy.  That is, they do not wield significant power until the U.S. wishes to pursue a policy objective via the United Nations (UN), and more specifically, the U.N. Security Council as is the case with the U.S.’s current strategy in containing Iran’s uranium enrichment program.  The veto-wielding power enjoyed by both Russia and China in the UN Security Council is especially crucial in this situation because both Russia and China enjoy close economic ties with Iran.  China, ever in need of more energy to fuel its booming economy, especially relies upon Iran for stable oil shipments[43].  Therefore, both countries have been very reluctant to impose any type of sanctions through the UN, which could put their relationship with Tehran at risk.  Russia has been the most vocal—although supported by China—in striking down sanctions that it perceives as being dangerously harsh.  In mid-August the three major European powers, Britain, France, and Germany, circulated a draft resolution in response to Iran failing to meet an August 31, 2006, Security Council deadline to halt the further enrichment of uranium.  Russia complained that the resolution went too far.  Specifically, Russia, which is currently building a nuclear power plant at Bushehr, wants to continue to be able to build and supply that power plant and eliminate any mention of travel bans and asset freezes.  It wishes to restrict sanctions only to the trade in technology and equipment that could aid in Iran’s development of nuclear and ballistic weapons[44].  However, that Russia, and subsequently China, is even considering the passage of sanctions is a positive development for the United States.  It was only after the U.S. supported Russia’s entrance into the WTO as a full partner that the Kremlin began to show willingness to cooperate on the Iran issue[45].   Although the issues of Iran’s uranium development project is important to both Russia and China, as it relates specifically to U.S. policy, both countries saliency is relatively low, especially since they are aware of their veto-powers in the UN Security Council and the U.S.’s current inability to act militarily. 

            Japan, as the only country to have ever been a victim of a nuclear attack, is torn between supporting U.S. policy and its own energy needs.  Consuming 22 percent of Iranian oil exports and with a Japanese company, Inpex Corp., having won the development rights in February of 2004 to the Azadegan oil field in Iran, Japan is weary to support any actions or sanctions that could lead to it losing the development rights.  Capable of producing up to 260,000 barrels a day, the field, when fully developed, could increase Japan’s imports of self-developed oil by 60 percent.  Japan is further concerned that were it to lose the development rights, its regional rival China would gain access in its place.  Given the huge economic stakes, Japan would be especially hard hit by any type of sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council and is therefore pressuring Washington to be very deliberate in considering and formulating its policy towards negotiating with Iran.  With its huge reliance on Iranian oil for economic stability and its reliance on the U.S. for security, Japan’s salience to this issue is very high. 

            France and Germany have been very helpful in going along with Britain in taking the European lead in drafting sanctions against Iran over its uranium enrichment program.  Although both countries are not as influential as Britain, their help is nevertheless extremely important in propelling any kind of resolution through the UN Security Council.  Their current proposal is backed by the U.S. and calls for wide spread sanctions including:

• That nations prevent the sale or transfer to Iran of “all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile program.”
• The freezing of funds and assets of entities and individuals somehow associated with Iran’s nuclear or ballistic missile program.
• A travel ban on individuals identified as being responsible in the weapons program.
• The prohibition of “specialized teaching or training of Iranian nationals” in disciplines that could aid in the nation’s development of a nuclear or ballistic missile program.
• A request that the Director-General of the IAEA provide a report on whether or not Iran had suspended all nuclear activities.
• The consideration of the suspension of the above sanctions if Iran complies with the resolution but threatens further sanctions if Iran fails to comply[46].

Although France and Germany are fairly equal partners with the UK in the European leadership of sanctions, they are not as connected to the issue to Britain in that they do not have a large troop presence in Iraq or extremely vital economic ties to Iran such as Russia, China, or Japan.  Therefore, their salience to the U.S. policy stance is relatively low. 

Forecast and Restrictions

            Based on an examination of the available data, a judgment on the relative powers and salience to each stakeholder, the expected utility model as described above predicts that the U.S. will pursue a policy that includes engaging Iran in talks but with the very real possibility of a continued push for strong sanctions as currently proposed by Britain, France, and Germany in the UN Security Council.  Although the Bush Administration and its base of Republican supporters would prefer no talks or regime change to any action led by the UN, the model predicts that it will seek to capture the median voters who seek some talks with the very real threat of strong sanctions.  However, in the course of seeking the support of these median voters, the Administration will have to alter its position to be more similar with this prevailing group. 

As this application is a simplified version of what is in reality a very complicated, data intensive model, some aspects of the policy decision are not properly accounted for.  At the most basic level, the identification of the stakeholders could be more in-depth.  I did not specifically take into account different factions of the Republican Party in Congress because of the lack of easily discernible data on their positions.  Instead, I assumed that by dividing the Bush Administration and its key advisers, I could adequately account for most differences within the Republican Party.  I was able to somewhat successfully separate the Democratic Party based on a handful of outspoken Democratic Senators—but these few cannot entirely be representative of the entire Party.  Furthermore, I made what some individuals might consider a serious omission by not taking into account the positions of other Middle Eastern states like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey.  While these states do play a role on America’s policy decision, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia as close allies, I feel like in this model their relative power and salience levels would be so low that regardless of their positions, they would not be able to move the policy in either direction away from the median voter. 

Finally, another flaw in this application of the model involves the lack of a strong coefficient that represents bargaining between the various states.  Were I able to apply this aspect of the expected utility model at a more advanced level, I believe that the median voter could move towards “Talks/Soft Sanctions.”  Currently the model places the median voter less than 3 index points away from “Talks/Soft Sanctions.”  Given the absolute veto powers of China and Russia and their close economic ties to Iran, it is unlikely that they would give into U.S. demands for strong, broad sanctions.  Such a lack of support would render a U.N. Security Council resolution, as it is currently written, un-passable.  Therefore, assuming that the U.S. would rather benefit from some additional utility versus none, a more advanced model would enable bargaining such that the U.S. would shift its policy to accommodate the needs of other veto-holding members of the Security Council. 

Conclusion

            Bueno de Mesquita’s expected utility model is a robust tool that has proven itself over the past 25 years through continual development and rigorous application.  Although this model forecasts a policy decision which has not yet been made, I am fairly confident that taking into account the restrictions mentioned above, including the rapidly developing nature of the available information, the forecast will be quite precise.  However, as at the time of this writing many positions were still being developed by the various stakeholders; it will be interesting to see how the coming weeks and months continue to solidify the stance of the stakeholders identified for this model.  Those more developed positions, while not altering the model’s fundamental design or application, but by changing its most important imputs, could ultimately lead to an entirely different outcome than the one predicted here. 

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I am admittedly a huge fan of the Houston Metro Rail.  I tried to put some thought into my enthusiasm when I completed this term paper for an urban politics class at Rice at the end of 2006.  SAJ –

An enthusiastic Houston Mayor Lee Brown and officials from Houston’s transit authority, METRO, drove gold spikes into the ground on Tuesday, March 13, 2001, in a ceremony to inaugurate the beginning of construction of METRORail’s first light rail line.  The precious metal metaphor inevitably vexed many opponents of the 7.5-mile line given the $324 million cost paid for entirely using local funds.  The expense seemed even more outrageous given that the line was not projected to reduce congestion or related air pollution.  Conversely, supporters of the line argued that the rail would be a cleaner and quieter substitute to buses along the route, serve as a catalyst for the revitalization of the surrounding areas, and link together important attractions of the city such as Reliant Park, the Texas Medical Center, and downtown, thereby helping to elevate Houston to a world class city that could support major events like Super Bowl XXXVIII.  Furthermore, these proponents argue that the cost to the local transit authority would not have been so high had Texas Representative and then House Majority Leader Tom Delay not blocked some $65 million in federal funding for the project.  These pro-rail viewpoints prevailed and the Red Line, or Main Street Line, opened to great fanfare on January 1, 2004, but the debate continues.  Whether light rail transit (LRT) provides the best benefits for the maximum number of riders, actually alleviates traffic congestion and related issues, or is just a sinkhole for hard earned tax dollars is a contentious issue that continues to rock the city of Houston as it attempts to expand upon that single line.

             In some ways the Red Line was a step backwards for Houstonians.  Indeed, more than a century ago beginning in 1869 the city and even its surrounding communities benefited from a form of LRT.  Originally powered by horses and mules and subsequently by 1891 with electricity, rail transit dominated the Houston mass transit scene.  In 1911, even a line between Houston and Galveston powered by electric rail cars operated.  Following a national trend, buses and cars did not alter the transportation paradigm in Houston until about 1920 when an the estimated 90 miles of track began to be ripped out the ground to make room for the new gas burning machines.  In 1936, the Houston-Galveston line ceased to operate and the entire rail line closed by 1940.  Privately operated cars and buses ruled the cityscape until 1974 when the city of Houston took ownership of the bus system and then in 1978 mandated the creation of a regional rapid transit agency, METRO, which began service in 1979.  With the creation of METRO, the city did not simply intend to improve the operation of buses, but to create an efficient, modern rail system.  However, Road Warriors opposed, delayed, and blocked the adoption and implementation of a rail component until Mayor Lee Brown took office in 1998 and finally succeeded in providing METRO with the mandate and resources to implement rail. 

            The Red Line (Appendix A) was supposed to be the shiny new example of advanced LRT technology that would leave Houstonians begging for more.  With planning having commenced in 1998 and construction lasting between 2001 and 2003, the line extends 7.5 miles from just outside of Houston’s most coveted real estate ringed by Interstate 610 and enormous Reliant Stadium into the heart of downtown ending at the University of Houston.  Riding atop two busy thoroughfares alongside cars, trucks, and buses, it takes one of the Siemens Avanto S-70 trains 32 minutes to cover sixteen stations and run the entire course of the line.  The new line has delivered upon some of its promises.  Business along the corridor has boomed, going from just 9 when construction began in 2001 to 42 in 2006.  Property values have increased an average 20-25% more than adjacent property and 346 daily bus trips have been eliminated along the route.  However, these mostly positive gains did come at cost.  Construction of the new line was long and ugly, so painful for the city that Houston Chronicle staff writer Rick Casey likened it to “several years of the urban equivalent of a root canal.”  Finally, there was the cost.  At $324 million, the project was expensive, and it was funded for entirely by METRO, local funds—and the cost continues.  Despite assurances to the contrary, METRO has cut bus service, cut public safety expenditures, and even assumed debt for the first time in its history.  However, the project would not have been such a burden on METRO had federal transit funds been granted towards the project.  Those funds, some $65 million worth, never made it to Houston at the behest of Sugarland Representative Tom Delay, who opposed the project on the public reason that it was too much money for a project that was never put to a referendum.  Therefore, when METRO looked to expand past the Red Line in 2003 with the aid of federal matching funds, it was forced to put its plan to a referendum. 

Introduction to the 2003 Referendum

            In 2003, METRO began to lay the foundation for its vision of mass transit in the greater Houston area through 2025.  Because House Majority Leader DeLay ostensibly blocked METRO’s previous request for federal transit funds on the basis that it had not been approved by the voters, the transit expansion vision, Metro Solutions, was scheduled for a referendum to be held that year on November 4^th in correspondence with the mayoral race.  The referendum (Appendix B) asked for voters, anyone residing within Metro’s service area, to endorse three major ideas.  First, it called for voters to allow METRO to issue  $640 million in bonds for the construction of an additional 22 miles of light rail along five, vaguely identified corridors that would begin service between 2008 and 2012.  Secondly, voters were asked to endorse the Metro Solutions plan through 2025, which includes 51 miles of light and commuter rail (in addition to the 22 for light rail by 2012), a 50% increase in bus service with the addition of 44 new routes, new transit centers and Park & Ride lots, and the expansion and improvement of existing High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes.  Finally and of least controversy, the plan also asked voters to extend road agreements through 2014 that would put an additional $774 million into the hands of local governments for the construction and maintenance of streets.  However, the referendum only outlined funding plans through 2014; voters would have to approve another referendum in or after 2009 in order to provide the adequate funds to fully realize the project.  Importantly, the referendum also stated clearly that no new or higher taxes would be levied to pay for the project.  However, despite levying no ostensible, additional costs to the taxpayers, the referendum became a polarizing issue with vocal and well funded representatives both for and against. 

            The referendum was a rather difficult issue for METRO.  As far as the average voter, or the swing-voter, was concerned, it was firstly a mater of timing.  The referendum came in 2003 two months before the first line was even scheduled to begin operation.  That there was no successful and efficient model to convince voters of the greatness of light rail also did not help the fact that the painful construction of that first line was not even complete.  The Houston Chronicle likened the timing of the referendum to “asking a woman in labor if she wants another baby after this one.”  Although the timing was not good, it was nonetheless essential.  METRO faced an early 2004 deadline to apply for federal funding for the proposal.  Failure to apply by that deadline would lock the project out of funding for at least seven more years.  Furthermore, whereas representatives in Congress would normally be expected to obligingly pork barrel the funds into their districts, Tom DeLay and John Culbertson oddly enough were at the point refusing to go along with the plan.  Therefore, the stage was set for what was to be an extremely contentious vote; voters, politicians and the interests that they represented lined up against each other.

The Common Voters

            For the common voter, the issue about expanding MetroRAIL really comes down to improving quality of life, whether an expanded rail system will improve that voters well being.  This improvement in well being comes in many forms such as a decrease in traffic congestion, an improvement in air quality, and a rise in the affected areas attractiveness resulting in property value increases.  For the people who are actually casting the votes, they want to know what are the tangible benefits to them.  That they might hold the MetroRAIL to such a high standard could come as somewhat of a surprise given that the referendum calls for no new or higher taxes, but voters could be adversely affected for example if in order to fund the new LRT METRO reduces bus services or cuts back on security or funds for its general mobility program towards the improvement of street conditions.  However, given that Houston has the worst air quality in the nation and is among the worst for traffic congestion, a better mass transit system seems like a logical direction to pursue.  But is LRT the best form of mass transit?  The question about light rail is whether it provides an economical solution, one where the costs is able to justify the quality and quantity of service that it provides to the most amount of people.  And to the detriment of light rail advocates, there are plenty of esteemed groups and individuals arguing that LRT does not provide this benefit.  For example, a senior economist at the Federal Reserve Bank in St. Louis argues that a LRT system there was less effective than providing a new Toyota Prius to every rider on the system.  Therefore, especially in a city and state dominated by Road Warriors, the bar is set very high for projects that seek to decrease the importance of wheeled transportation. 

The Politicians

            The politics surrounding METRO’s referendum is extraordinarily interesting.  Congressional support in the house has been split entirely among party lines.  Democratic Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, whose 18^th district is mostly composed of urban Houston, expressed her unwavering support for Metro Solutions.  In her support, she even went so far as to attack plans presented as alternatives to Metro Solutions and the politicians, fellow Members of Congress, who supported the measure.  Rooting his support in the need to improve congestion and pollution problems, Democrat Gene Green, whose 29^th district represents much of greater Houston, urged voters to approve the measure.  Republican representative from Texas’s 7^th district, which includes Houston suburbs Bellaire, Southside, and West University but not urban Houston, vocally expressed his dissent for the referendum citing the need to utilize funds only where they will “move the most people with the greatest impact” such as his project to widen Interstate 10 towards Katy.  Finally, the most vocal and starkest opponent of Metro Solutions given his powerful position at the time as House Majority Leader, Representative Tom Delay of the Texas 22^nd District, which includes Sugarland and Baytown, even went so far to donate $30,000 via a political action committee towards the anti LRT group, Texans for True Mobility. 

That two out of four members of the House of Representatives from Houston would not support sending money back to their constituencies seems absurd until one understands what constituencies these congress people really represent.  Case in point, Sheila Jackson Lee and Gene Green represent the constituency that is most directly affected by the LRT expansion plans as outlined by Metro Solutions.  Their constituents are the ones who would actually see some sort of new service as the result of the expansion plans.  However, Representatives DeLay and Culbertson, conversely, do not represent urban Houston.  They represent the suburbs like Sugarland, Baytown, and Bellaire.  Their constituents are the voters who commute relatively long distances from the suburbs into the city to work.  Their constituents are the people and businesses benefiting from booming suburban growth.  The LRT expansion in the Metro Solutions plan does not extend rail to their constituents.  Rather, DeLay and Culbertson would rather see money spent on widening the interstates and highways that fuel their constituency’s growth.  For example, in the noise following up to the referendum, Culberson was an ardent supporter of the “100% Plan” that would presumably entail more commuter rail lines to the suburb, more toll roads, more and bigger roads, and the diversion of truck traffic around the city.  However, as Jackson Lee pointed out, the 100% Plan is “an unfinished study and not a plan at all…[and] is based on a wish list of regional road and transit projects that have no identified funding and would require significant amounts of right away.”  However, perhaps Culbertson and more importantly Tom DeLay could find a way to obtain that funding.  The Houston Chronicle even goes so far as to assert that DeLay’s rise to power in Congress was funded by the highway lobby.  Therefore, while Culbertson, DeLay, Green, and Jackson Lee all represent Houston in some way, they ultimately represent different constituents who are unequally affected by the expansion plan outlined by Metro Solutions, and to this extent, they all asserted somewhat different view points. 

Congressional representatives were not the only major, political stakeholders involved, mayors, past and present naturally took a strong stance on the issue; even Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison took a stance.  Former Mayor Bob Lanier was at the time a Road Warrior who believed the future of Houston lay in more concrete and asphalt.  The Houston Chronicle posits that perhaps his stance was related to his close relationship with the Landar Corp., which had demonstrated great foresight in purchasing property along future road developments or from his close relationship with Texas businessmen and developers with an interest in maintaining strong highway infrastructures.  The successor to Bob Lanier, Lee Brown, thought otherwise.  The mayor who was successful in pushing through the first segment of METRORail said that he wanted to bring LRT to Houston in order to shape it into a “world-class city” and that it was a “good way to end [his] term.”  Finally, contrary to her fellow party members in the House of Representatives, Texas Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson supported the LRT initiative vowing to recommend more than $90 million in federal funding from her seat on a federal appropriations subcommittee.  After the referendum narrowly passed 52% to 48%, Hutchison released a statement saying:

Now that this hard-fought – and often heated – campaign has come to a close, it’s time to put differences aside and move forward. Houstonians have spoken in support of light-rail. It’s time to get to work to ensure Metro builds a world-class transportation system that addresses Houston’s pressing mobility needs. I am committed to helping them in every way possible to achieve this goal.

Although a supporter of Metro Solutions from the beginning, Senator Hutchison’s statement after the referendum’s passage is also representative of the mindset of opponents Culbertson and DeLay.  Culbertson especially announced that, following the decision of the voters, would support METRO in any way that he could, but that ultimately it was up to METRO to demonstrate to the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) that the plan outlined in Metro Solutions was worthy of federal funding. 

Making Metro Solutions Work

            In 2005, bowing to pressure from Tom DeLay and John Culberson and an FTA that was increasingly in favor of Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) over LRT, Mayor Bill White announced a change to the Metro Solutions plan approved by voters in 2003.  The new plan keeps only one of the originally planned four new LRT lines and introduces in their place extensive BRT networks in addition to around 28 miles of commuter tail.  The issue of the BRT lines is of particular interest.  The buses, designed to resemble trains, will run on dedicated surfaces embedded with rail capable of hosting trains in the future.  Furthermore, passengers will ingress and egress utilizing platforms which could later serve trains.  Basically, the only thing missing from these new BRT lines are the trains and the associated electrical infrastructure to host them.  The promise from METRO to LRT supporters is that one day, when ridership increases to the point where it is cost effective, trains will replace the buses.  However, even with the change in course, federal funding is not entirely assured for the plan.  In this application cycle, $50 billion of projects have been proposed when only $9 billion is available.  Fortunately, Culberson insists that he is now on the side of METRO and will even seek legislation that allows METRO to apply the more than $300 million from the construction of the Red Line toward the federally required matching funds stipulation.  Former and continuing proponents of the original Metro Solutions Plan were not entirely that disappointed by the new revisions.  On the issue of BRT lines, Green stated that he wants “those rails in the ground, and if we have to go a year or two with buses and rubber tires…then we can fight in a few years over whether we can get the light rail there.”  Although an ostensible defeat for many strong supporters of LRT given the temporary loss of three completely electric, train-based lines, the compromise has allowed METRO to move ahead with planning for the city’s second LRT line, the University Line.

The University Line

            In the continuing debate over LRT implementation in Houston, the most recent point of contention centers on the one entirely new line that survived the 2005 plan change.  Originally identified on the ballot in the 2003 referendum as the “Westpark” line, it was to have extended between the existing Red Line station at Wheeler and the Hillcroft Transit Center by 2012.  Although voters ostensibly approved this line in the referendum, many thought that they were approving a line that would run atop Westpark Drive as opposed to a line that would merely follow the direction of Westpark Drive as is the case with the currently preferred route atop Richmond Avenue.  METRO Board Chairman David Wolff argues that “at no point does [the referendum ballot] say that [the University Line] would be built on Westpark Drive”.  However, Chris Segar, whose neighborhood of Afton Oaks lies along Richmond Avenue, feels like he has been lied to:

METRO is trying to nullify the referendum! They have renamed the route ”University Line’” and are planning to build it on Richmond Avenue. METRO should study the democratic process before they study how [t]o get around it. If METRO can set aside the results of this referendum, how can citizens of Houston expect anything we vote on in the future to be binding?

However, even if this tenuous legal argument were not to hold up, Segar argues that there are other valid reasons to place the line on Westpark.  He argues that Richmond is not wide enough to support the rail, that more needy, lower income residents would be served along Westpark, that METRO already owns a suitable right-of-way on Westpark, and finally that beautiful, mature trees would be destroyed if the line were constructed along Richmond.  The people who do not want rail on Richmond have a pretty strong case, but as to any controversy, there is always another side with an equally valid case.

            Richmondrail.org is a political action committee which as of August, 2006, had already gathered more than 1,200 signatures from those wanting the University Line to be built along Richmond.  In their pamphlet entitled, “We want facts not fear,” the group argues that placing rail along Richmond would be a boon to the local community.  They cite studies showing that rail increases property value and argue that businesses along rail have been more successful.  They point out that Houston is growing and will have too much automotive congestion, that trains are more efficient, that no automobile lanes or private property will be lost, and finally that the latest design studies do not call for the destruction of the beautiful trees along the median. 

            Although the two sides differences are not so irreconcilable that a lawsuit has been filed, threats have been made.  The most likely foundation for a lawsuit would focus on the 2003’s language allowing for citizens to continue to provide input in the planning phase of new lines.  To this extent, the Greater Houston Partnership, a powerful coalition of Houston businesses, has announced that METRO should be allowed to explore different options without having to put the issue to a referendum.  However, although support is lining up behind METRO just like in 2003, a best case scenario would be one without the additional costs and headache of litigation.  To this extent, METRO’s stance remains that it has not decided where to place the University Line. 

Conclusion

            METRORail has a lot going for it.  If one is to believe the statistics that it provides touting the success of its singular, Red Line, then who can really hope or want to stop such amazing progress?  Increasing public transportation by utilizing more efficient technologies and systems makes a lot of sense in a city where congestion and related pollution are increasingly out of control.  Expansion of highways and reliance on cleaner internal combustion technology can only yield so much improvement.  That some pain might be felt today with regards to construction or reduced automobile access is a very small price to pay for the prospect of having a less congested and easier to breath future.  We can only hope that the politicians will be able to overcome their short-sightedness in order to build the kind of world class city that we know we can and should build into the 22^nd century. 

Appendix A (see attachment MetroMap.pdf)

Appendix B, 2003 METRO Referendum

Authorization of Metro to issue bonds, notes and other obligations payable, in whole or in part, from 75% of Metro’s sales and use tax revenues in an aggregate principal amount not to exceed $640,000,000 for Metro’s transit authority system, including the Metro Solutions transit system plan (as described in Exhibits A and A-1 of Metro Resolution No. 2003-77 and the official notice of election, which are incorporated herein), which includes bus service expansions (including new buses, bus routes, transit centers, and Park & Ride facilities) and construction of extensions and new segments of Metro’s rail system known as “MetroRail,” approval of such plan and construction of all segments of the MetroRail and commuter line components (including approximately 64.8 miles of light rail and 8 miles of commuter line, as described in Exhibits A and A-3 through A-9 of such resolution and the official notice of election, which are specifically incorporated herein and generally summarized below), and dedication of 25% of Metro’s sales and use tax revenues through September 30, 2014, to street improvements and related projects as authorized by law, and with no increase in the current rate of Metro’s sales tax.

* * * * * * *

The following summary lists the components and segments of MetroRail and commuter line, as described in Exhibits A and A-3 through A-9 of such resolution and the official notice of the election, and is a part of the ballot and the proposition being submitted to the voters at the election. The segments marked ** are expected to be completed by the end of 2012 utilizing the proceeds of the $640 million of bonds, if approved at the election.

1. NORTH HARDY

**A. UH-Downtown to Northline Mall

B. Northline Mall to Greenspoint

C. Greenspoint to Bush IAH Airport

2. SOUTHEAST

**A. Downtown/Bagby to Dowling

**B. Dowling to Griggs/610

C. Griggs/610 to Park & Ride in the vicinity of Hobby Airport

D. Sunnyside: Southeast Transit Center to Bellfort

E. Sunnyside: Bellfort to Airport Blvd.

3. HARRISBURG

**A. Dowling to Magnolia Transit Center

B. Magnolia Transit Center to Gulfgate Center

C. Gulfgate Center to Telephone Road

4. WESTPARK

**Wheeler Station to Hillcroft Transit Center

5. UPTOWN/WEST LOOP

Westpark to the Northwest Transit Center

6. INNER KATY

Downtown/Bagby to Northwest Transit Center

7. SOUTHWEST COMMUTER LINE

Fannin South Park & Ride to Harris County line

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            < http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl?id=2001_3288300>.

Sallee, Rad.  “Metro board’s chief urges caution with rail language.”  Houston Chronicle.  16

            April 2006.  <http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/moveit/3797610.html>.

Sallee, Rad.  “Partnership ups ante in match over rail route.”  Houston Chronicle.  9 April 2006.

            <http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/moveit/3782837.html>.

Segar, Chris.  “Choices for Growth – Why the Westpark Rail Line Makes Sense.”  Upper Kirby

            Citizen Participation Platform.  April 2006.  <http://www.upperkirby.org/index.php?

option=com_content&task=view&id=115&Itemid=177>.

Simon, Laurence.  “The first rumblings of a Richmond-line lawsuit.”  Bloghouston.net. 

            <http://www.bloghouston.net/item/3525>.

Singleton, Keenan.  “DeLaying Light Rail.”  University of Houston.  14 April 2001. 

<http://soc.hfac.uh.edu/artman/publish/article_104.shtml>.

Stark, Joachim.  “Significant Milestone for Siemens Turnkey Project in the USA: First Avanto

S70 unveiled in Houston.”  Siemens.  2 May 2003.  <http://www.transportation. siemens.com/ts/en/pub/newsline/newsline/presse_2003/2003/02_05_2003.htm>.

“The Facts: METRORail on main Street.”  Houston Metropolitan Transit Authority. 

            <http://metrosolutions.org/go/doc/1068/112217/>.

“We want facts not fear.”  Richmondrail.org.  Pamphlet Available online.

<http://www.richmondrail.org/blogs/>.

Whited, Kevin.  “Mayor White revises mobility plan approved by voters.”  Bloghouston.net.  13

            June 2006.  <http://www.bloghouston.net/item/1344>.

I completed this short essay at the end of 2007 for a class at Peking University on rural economics.  In it I talk about the poor state of the Chinese healthcare system especially for the vast majority of the population that is the peasantry.  SAJ. –

During the height of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in 2003, three hospitals refused to help Liu Ruiqiang.  Some hospital staff even refused to examine Mr. Liu for fear of contracting the syndrome.  When the fourth hospital, Number 2 Hospital of Shanxi Medical University, finally agreed to admit Mr. Liu for treatment, they required a deposit of RMB 724.  However, because Mr. Liu has no insurance and earns less than 300 USD per annum, he could not afford to pay these hospital bills.  Fearing that he might incur high debt from his hospital stay, he fled until he was apprehended by authorities.  Mr. Liu’s case is not unique.  As China’s health care system continues to privatize, most of the eighty percent of rural citizens, “can’t afford to get sick” which leads to even more complicated problems.

  China’s health care system has not always strapped its indigent with such burdens.  Its system used to be a model for the world.  In fact between the 1970s and 1980s when mortality rates ceased to improve throughout the world, China’s mortality rate continued to decrease.  Mao Zedong’s system of centralized planning and the creation of rural communes beginning in the 1950s largely contributed to the expansion of health care to China’s rural population by redistributing resources from the richer, urban coasts to the poorer, rural interior.  The government owned and operated medical facilities and salaried all medical personnel.  Private practices ceased to exist.  Communes provided the Cooperated Medical System, from which the famous “barefoot doctors” practiced, a combination of western and contemporary eastern medicine.  Central planning provided the political means to redistribute capital while the system of rural communes provided the infrastructure and funding for rural health care programs.

Mao’s reforms ushered in a revolution in Chinese health care that witnessed a rapid decline in the incidence of endemic and epidemic infectious disease.  Between 1952 and 1982 the infant mortality rate fell from 200 to 34 per 1000 live births.  Likewise, life expectancy increased from 35 to 68 years.  In combination with a large increase in spending, Mao’s medical system helped to restrain infectious diseases through widely available, free immunization, improved sanitation, and environmental controls.  By the mid 1980s China had experienced the same type of transformation that the west had seen—infections diseases gave way to chronic diseases such as heart disease, cancer, and stroke as the leading cause of premature death.

The reforms of Deng Xiaoping began to have noticeable effects on China’s health system by the mid 1980s.  Deng aimed to decrease the central government’s involvement in local affairs and to this extent also decreased central funding for local services.  Instead, the burden of funding services such as healthcare was shifted to the provinces.  As a result, Deng created a system of two Chinas, one highlighted by the wealthy coastal provinces, and one marred with poor, inland provinces.  Between 1978 and 1999 the central government’s share of national health care spending decreased from 32 to 15 percent which in effect sanctioned the privatization of hospitals and clinics.

Whereas the socialist health care system under Mao provided near universal coverage and focused on preventative medicine, the new system created under Deng limited coverage to those who could pay and focused on curative medicine.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, practitioners received a subsidy from the village of one to eight hundred RMB.  Faced with this paltry compensation, practitioners supplemented their incomes by engaging in non medical activities or the reselling of medicine.

The central government enforced a strict policy of price control on practitioners but at the same time permitted the profitable sell of medicines.  Furthermore, recognizing the need to supplement practitioner’s salaries, the central government allowed them to earn bonuses determined by how much revenue they generated for their local healthcare facility.  The immediate result of these reforms was a dramatic increase in the sell of expensive services and medicines: 

Patients who go in for toothaches are urged to get expensive procedures, such as MRIs or CT scans. Half of all pregnant women at some hospitals undergo Caesarean sections, at prices roughly twice that of a normal delivery. Antibiotics and name-brand medications are routinely overprescribed. And patients are increasingly expected to tip their doctors with a hong bao, or red pouch…

The inadvertent privatization of the healthcare industry had wider effects than simply an increase in drug sales.  The demise of the collectives meant that peasants no longer benefited from free or heavily subsidized insurance.  As a result, in 2002 only 29 percent of Chinese enjoy health insurance, and out-of-pocket expenses accounted for nearly sixty percent of health care spending compared to just twenty percent in 1978.  Lack of available insurance translates into unobtainable healthcare.  A 1998 investigation revealed that over thirty-seven percent of China’s 900 million strong rural population could not afford to see a doctor while another sixty-five percent of sick peasants enjoyed little to no access to hospitals services

Peasants often face a multi-faceted dilemma when they need to obtain health services.  First, they can choose not to seek the help of professionals and risk exacerbating their condition.  Secondly, should they choose to go to the hospital, they often have to wait for periods of over twenty four hours at a time.  Finally, should they not have the luxury of time, they can pay the professional a higher rate or seek the aid of a scalper to win an earlier appointment.  For example, Zhan Yanpo waited overnight outside of Beijing’s most famous hospital, Peking Union Medical College Hospital, in order to secure an appointment with a specialist.  When he finally saw this specialist, the practitioner ordered a CT scan at a cost of over $90—roughly the Mongolian farmer’s entire monthly income.  While the $90 CT scan bill was expensive, at least Mr. Zhan only had to pay $1.50 for his appointment because he waited.  He could have skipped the line and visited the same practitioner by visiting the “Specialists Department” and paid $37.  Unfortunately, even these “specialists” appointments are hard to come by because scalpers often obtain them and then sell them outside of the hospital at a premium.   

Some peasants avoid the high cost of seeing a practitioner altogether.  Zhang Dewen has not seen a doctor in years: “When we’re working in the fields, we farmers have our own way of curing things.”  Mr. Zhang relies instead on what he thinks of as a panacea—a potion composed of boiled ginger.  Not seeing a practitioner may save Mr. Zhang and his family the burden of expensive hospital bills, but the rudimentary medical skills that he and peasants like him possess often lead to more harm than good.  For example, the lack of quality healthcare in China’s poor areas often has the ability to affect people in other nations such as with SARS and Avian Flu. 

When the poor peasants that comprise some eighty percent of China’s population earn their livelihoods by working in the fields, good health is their best asset.  Increasing health care costs also increase the gap between rich and poor, angering the poor.  A 1996 survey found that eighteen percent of rural households incurred health bills that exceeded their incomes.  The Chinese government is aware of the problem; a recent poll conducted by the International Institute for Urban Development found that “fairly priced health care” is the primary concern of China’s rural dwellers.  This concern ranks above such other pertinent issues such as freedom of movement, government corruption, and environmental dangers.  Unhappy peasants pose a risk towards China’s political stability.  In 2004 alone there were nearly 74,000 large protests, up from just 10,000 a decade earlier.  Fearing that the health care issue could lead to even more riots, the Chinese Communist Party plans reforms.

In 2002 the central government experimented with a rudimentary health care safety net.  The system provided the equivalent of $2.50 a year towards basic insurance premiums for peasants; peasants had also to contribute an additional $1.25 a year.  However, because both parties provided only very low levels of funding, the resulting insurance only covered in-patient visits with very high deductibles.  Therefore, peasants still suffered form a lack of primary care and affordable medicines.  Currently, the government is experimenting with other measures to improve the situation. 

China’s Vice Minister of Health, Jiefu Huang, admitted to faculty of Harvard Medical School that reforms over the past two decades have been ineffective.  He cites difficulties as the result of China’s transformation from a rural, agricultural society to an urban, industrial society.  Currently the country faces a multitude of medical challenges including the AIDS epidemic, malaria and tuberculosis, and newly emerging diseases such as SARS.  Increasingly the country must also face with the chronic health conditions associated with a western lifestyle such as heart disease, obesity, and high blood pressure.  Furthermore the country also faces demographic challenges with a population that is quickly becoming older rather than younger—a result of the one child policy.

The government seems to lack a clear vision for improving healthcare in its rural areas.  Huang asserts that China is improving coordination between government bureaucracies, investing in its health infrastructure, and reforming its cost structures.  Huang acknowledges that, “Good health care is a universal objective of all human beings,” but provides no tangible method for obtaining this goal in China.  In 2003 per capita health spending totaled only $33 compared to the United States’s expenditures of $2,368. 

When pressed on many issues by western governments, China often retorts that it needs time to ameliorate its problems, citing that western countries such as the United States and Britain required nearly an entire century after the industrial revolution began to reach where they are now.  However, China cannot always look to the histories of western, more developed nations for answers.  The United States itself suffers from analogous problems: complex and bloated health care systems in urban areas and dangerously minimal services for rural, poor areas.  Unfortunate both for the teacher and the student, the United States also doesn’t know what to do with its medical problems.

Works Cited

Blumenthal, David and William Hsiao.  “Privatization and Its Discontents—The Evolving

Chinese Health Care System.”  The New England Journal of Medicine.  353(11): 1165-

1170.  PubMed.

 “China Strives to Ensure Medical Care of Rural People.”  People’s Daily.  28 June 2001.

< http://english.people.com.cn/english/200106/28/eng20010628_73675.html>.

French, Howard W.  “Anger in China Rises over Threat to Environment.”  The New York Times.

19 July 2005.  < http://www.melbourne.indymedia.org/news/2005/07/93844.php>.

Lynch, David J.  “Rural China Woefully Unprepared for SARS.”  USA Today.  21 May 2003.

<http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidinthenews/articles/usatoday_052103.html>.

Murphy, Rachel.  How Migran Labor Is Changing Rural China.  Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2002.

Osnos, Evan.  “In China, Health Care is Scalpers, Lines, Debt.”  Chicago Tribune.  28 Sept 2005.

< http://www.chicagotribune.com/features/health/chi-0509280119sep28,1,625372.story>.

Powell, Alvin.  “Health Care Reform in China Discussed.”  Harvard Gazette.  15 Sept 2005.

< http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2005/09.15/09-china.html>.

Unger, Jonathan.  The Transformation of Rural China.  London, M.E. Sharpe; 2002.

Walder, Andrew G.  Zouping In Transition.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998.

Wonacott, Peter.  “In Rural China, Health Care Grows Expensive and Elusive.”  The Wall Street

Journal.  19 May 2003.  < http://www.globalaging.org/ruralaging/world/ruralchina.htm>.

SAJ

—

Airbus im Verzug: Krise bei EADS und europäischen Regierungen

Im Juni verschob Airbus noch ein zweites Mal die Lieferung des A380, des größten Passagierflugzeuges der Welt.  Die Lieferung des ersten Flugzeugs wird mehr als ein halbes Jahr verspätet sein.  Weil Kunden Entschädigung für die Verspätung fordern werden, werden die Kosten für Airbus von zwei Milliarden Euro im Jahre 2006 und von 4,8 Milliarden Euro bis 2010 ausmachen.  Zur Strafe inszenierten die Börsenhändler eine große Dumping Aktion von EADS Aktien, sodass der Mutterkonzern von Airbus innerhalb von ein paar Tagen fast 20 Prozent von ihrem Wert verlor.  Resultierend aus dem nachfolgenden Spektakel traten der Chef von Airbus und auch der Chef von EADS zurück.  Unter neuem Management fordert Airbus Strukturanpassungen, die große Jobkürzungen vorsehen werden.  Jetzt, nur sechs Monate später, denken Gesellschaften und europäische Regierungen nach, ob sie ein großes oder kleines Aktienpaket bei EADS brauchen, so dass sie seine unterschiedlichen Interessen schützen können.  Weil EADS eine Allianz zwischen vielen europäischen Regierungen ist, hätte die Presse einen Heidenspaß.  Was früher den Stolz europäischer Findigkeit ausmachte, wird jetzt zum Inbegriff europäischer bürokratischer Unwirtschaftlichkeit. 

Die Struktur von EADS: Wie ein kleines Versorgungskettenproblem zu einem großen politischen Kopfschmerz wurde. 

Offensichtlich entzündete ein Missverständnis zwischen der Hauptfließbandarbeit in Toulouse und einem Hersteller in Hamburg dieses Problem.  Kabelbäume und andere Bauteile sollten vorinstalliert in Hamburg sein, bevor der Rumpfteil Toulouse erreicht hatte.  In Toulouse, wenn diese Teile nicht schon drinnen waren, mussten die Arbeiter viel mehr Zeit als geplant  brauchen und nachträglich Geld verlieren weil sie im Verzug sein würden. 

Aber die Realität ist viel komplizierter. Der Kern des Problems liegt in der Beziehung zwischen Airbus und EADS und den europäische Regierungen und EADS.  Airbus ist die Zivilluftfahrtabteilung von EADS, und EADS ist in Realität eine Allianz zwischen den britischen, französischen, deutschen, und spanischen Regierungen.  Im Jahre 2000 vereinten sich DaimlerChrysler Aerospace AG aus Deutschland, Aerospatiale Matra aus Frankreich, und CASA aus Spanien, um den Konzern EADS zu schaffen.  2001 gliederte sich auch BAE Systems aus Großbritannien ein.  Obwohl theoretisch EADS eine private Firma ist, die auf der Börse verhandelt wird, ist Politik doch sehr verwickelt.  Deshalb ist ein Problem nie nur ein Wirtschaftsproblem sondern auch ein politisches Problem. 

Airbus agiert: Neuer Umstrukturierungsplan resultiert in vielen Erschwernissen.

Der neue Chef von Airbus, Louis Gallois, weiß, dass Acht Milliarden Euro kein Kleingeld sind, deshalb hat er einen Sparplan namens„Power 8“ vorgelegt.  Das Programm besteht aus acht Unterprogrammen, von denen aber erst fünf eingeleitet wurden:

1. Die Verkürzung der Entwicklungszeiten für Flugzeuge von ca. 7,5 auf 5,5 Jahre
2. Die Verringerung der Verwaltungskosten um 30 Prozent
3. Die Steigerung der Produktivität in bestehenden Werken um 20 Prozent bis 2010
4. Die Verbesserung der Liquiditätssituation
5. Die Reorganisation der Wertschöpfungskette gegenüber Lieferanten und Unterauftragnehmern, mit denen Airbus in partnerschaftlicher Beziehung stehen will.

Zum Kern der Probleme, die das Programm versucht anzusprechen, sind drei Themen zu erwähnen.  Das erste Problem handelt von Technologie.  Airbus hat Werke in verschiedenen Ländern, und oft benutzen diese verschiedenen Werke auch ungleichartige Software.  Solch ein Widerspruch zwischen Werken ist teuer, unwirksam, und steigert die Möglichkeit, dass es zu Missverständnissen zwischen den teilnehmenden Werken kommen könnte, wie das Problem zwischen Hamburg und Toulouse.  Obwohl es nicht so einfach und teuer ist, diese verschiedenen Computersysteme zu integrieren, gibt es kein politisches Problem. 

Das zweite Problem handelt vom Währungssystem, besonders vom Unterschied zwischen Euro und dem US Dollar.  Weil Boeing, der größten Erzrivale aus den USA von Airbus,, fast nur US Dollars benutzt, hat die Firma einen Wettbewerbsvorteil gegenüber Airbus.  Außer wenn Airbus mehr außerhalb der Eurozone produziert oder Teile kauft, können sie nicht der Dollarschwäche entkommen.  Normalerweise ist solch ein Problem nicht so schwer zu vermeiden, für eine Privatfirma, weil sie nur in mehr in preisgünstigen Teilen der Welt produziert und dabei den Unterschied zwischen verschiedenen Währungen auszugleichen oder sogar auszunützen.  Aber Airbus ist keine normale Privatfirma, und das führt zu dem dritten Problem.

Das dritte Problem ist viel komplizierter als die anderen zwei, weil es nicht nur von Wirtschaftsproblemen sondern auch von politischen Problemen handelt.  Damit die Firma die Produktivität in bestehenden Werken steigern kann, muss sie wahrscheinlich Arbeiter, die in der Produktion arbeiten, entlassen.  Aber Entlassungen sind der Inbegriff von enormem politischen Kopfschmerz.  Jede Werkstatt zwischen Toulouse und Hamburg oder Madrid hat schon viel Geld investiert und natürlich will kein Politiker Jobs in seinem Hinterhof verlieren.  Obwohl dieses Problem am schwierigsten anzupacken ist, ist das Thema auch am wichtigsten.  Airbus muss abgespecken und auch effizienter werden oder es denen Firmen nachmachen, die bereit sind, globale Konkurrenz zu akzeptieren und damit umgehen können.

Die Presse reagiert.

Die Krise bei EADS ist so groß, dass jemand von fast jedenm Teil der  Gesellschaft betroffen ist.  Von dem Staatsbürger, der mit der Lieferverzögerung einen Job in Hamburg verliert, bis zu einem Börsenhändler, der in Frankfurt arbeitet, berichtet die Presse etwas für alle.

Normalerweise fangen diese Artikel immer gleich an.  Zuerst kommt ein Titel, der auffällig ist.  Dann kommt einen kürzerer Absatz, der einen Überblick zu dem ganzen Artikel gibt. In Ordnung von Wichtigkeit/Interesse kommen weitere Absätze zu dem Thema hinzu.  Am Ende gibt es manchmal einen kleinen Absatz zur Geschichte des Themas. 

Für die Leute, die in Hamburg wohnen, gibt es z.B. Artikel bei dem Hamburger Abendblatt über die Grundlage von der Verspätung und der Jobs.  Der Schwerpunkt für diesen Artikel ist, wie die Hansestadt Hamburg von dieser Krise betroffen wird.  Für diese Leute, besonders die, die bei dem Airbus Werk in Hamburg arbeiten, ist dieses Thema sehr wichtig. 

Das Hamburger Abendblatt berichtet für sie:

• „Airbus-Desaster: Konzernchef gibt Hamburg die Schuld“
• „Airbus: Jetzt wird es ernst: Der Flugzeughersteller Airbus macht Ernst mit seinem Sparkurs und setzt in Deutschland 1.000 seiner insgesamt 7.300 Leiharbeiter an die Luft.“
• „Hamburg steigt bei Airbus ein“

Der Focus berichtet:

• Airbus-Sparprogramm: Kampf um Standort Hamburg
• Zitat: Airbus gehört zu Hamburg dazu

Der Spiegel berichtet:

• Vertrag schützt deutsche A380-Produktion

Der NDR berichtet:

• Airbus-Krise: Toulouse oder Hamburg?

Was alle diese Artikel gemeinsam haben, ist wie sie über Hamburg berichten.  Aber, weil die Artikel eigentlich über Hamburg sind, ist das Thema wichtig für ganz Deutschland (und auch natürlich Europa), und diese Idee wird weit verbreitet durch die Artikel. Was vielleicht besonders interessant ist, ist wie die Artikel, obwohl die nicht Leitartikel sind, nicht so nachteilig sind.  Normalerweise wird man denken, besonders die Artikel, die aus Hamburg kommen, dass durch den Text ein deutliche Meinung angeboten wird, aber das ist nicht ganz richtig.  Für diese Art von Artikel ist das vielleicht wichtiger, dass Airbus und nachträglich Hamburg, Deutschland, erfolgreich sind. 

Wie ein Artikel berichtet, hängt ab vom intendierten Publikum.  Zum Beispiel ist die Berichterstattung von Wirtschaftsmedia nicht so freundlich.  Ein Kommentar bei der Financial Times Deutschland ist besonders vernichtend:

„Misstrauensvotum… der zwischenzeitlich mehr als 30 Prozent erreichte, ist ein fundamentales Misstrauensvotum gegenüber dem Airbus-Mutterkonzern EADS…Es ist etwas faul im Staate Airbus. Sehr faul… und zeigt sich, dass es massive Schwächen im Organisatorischen gibt. Konkurrent Boeing legt sich derweil mächtig ins Zeug, um wieder die globale Führung zu übernehmen.”

Die Welt ist auch nicht so freundlich wenn Herausgeber Ernst Ginten ruft für damals EADS Gustav Humbert zu liefern an [Diese Konstruktion ist unverständlich. Was meinen Sie? Wen ruft Ginten auf, was zu tun?]:

„ Die Verzögerung der Auslieferung des A380 ist ein Desaster… Dazu zählen nicht nur die Produktionsprobleme beim A380, sondern vor allem das neue Design und der Verkauf der neuen A350 – dem Konkurrenzmodell zu Boeings immer erfolgreicherem Dreamliner.”

Diese Kommentare bei finanziellen und konservativen Medien unterscheiden sich von normaler Bekanntmaching des Problems.  Das Publikum von solchen Pressemeldungen ist normalerweise ein sehr gehobenes und erfolgreiches.  Für sie ist die Sache nicht, „werde ich meinen Job verlieren“ aber diese Leute wollen wissen, „werde ich ein Million Euro beim Airbus Paket verlieren?  Und wenn ich so viel Geld verlieren könnte, warum hat dann der Chef von Airbus noch einen Job?!“  Der Kampf zwischen Airbus und Boeing ist auch sehr wichtig.  In diesem Artikel kann man auch ein bisschen europäischen Stolz auf Airbus heraushören.  Die Europäer waren früher so stolz auf dieses Großraumflugzeug, dass sie jetzt, wenn das Projekt so stark im Verzug ist, viel Angst davor haben, dass es eine Möglichkeit gibt, dass Boeing im Moment wettbewerbsfähiger sein wird. 

Ein Feiertag für Amerika?

Wenn die amerikanische First Lady eine neue Boeing 747 tauft, und wenn die Chefs von Großbritannien, Frankreich, Spanien, und Deutschland einen neuen Airbus A380 feiern, weist jeder darauf hin, dass die Flugzeug Industrie eine sehr politische Industrie ist—oder eine Industrie, die patriotische Glut anfacht.  Ob Regierungen in einem internationalen Gericht über die Fairness der Zuschüsse kämpfen oder die Presse über neue Aufträge schreibt, weisen Europäer und Amerikaner ähnlich darauf hin, dass die Rivalität zwischen Airbus und Boeing nicht nur ein Wettbewerb um Geld ist, sondern auch eine Konkurrenz für Herzen und Sinne ist.  Deshalb ist diese Krise bei Airbus auch sehr einfach für Amerikaner zu verstehen (erfassen).

Aber die Amerikaner können das so leicht verstehen, nicht nur weil sie einen Sieg für die amerikanische industrielle Fähigkeit sehen, sondern auch weil Boeing im Jahre1997 selbst in einer Krise wie Airbus steckte.  In dem Jahre war Boeing auch im Verzug.  Flugzeug Teile standen auch auf dem Boden.  Arbeiter verloren auch ihre Jobs.  Kunden forderten auch Entschädigung.  Und die Presse deklarierte auch eine Krise.  2006 ist für Airbus was 1997 für Boeing war.  Aber alles war nicht verloren für Boeing.  Die Firma hat sich prompt umgruppiert, ihre Kosten gekürzt, dieLogistik verbessert, und  ist dann knapper und stärker zurückgekehrt. 

Das war Boeing.  Boeing ist eine ganz private Firma.  Airbus ist eine Allianz zwischen drei europäischen Regierungen. 

Deutschland, Frankreich, Großbritannien, und Spanien

SAJ

—

SAJ

—

            The legacy of Mao Zedong is difficult to ascertain.  To some he is the father of modern China, a great unifier, and a liberator.  To others Mao ranks at the pinnacle of the worst of the worst: a power hungry tyrant who let nothing and no one stand in his way on the path to the top.  Evidence and anecdotal truths exist to support both views, yet like Mao’s very legacy itself, even the purported evidence in juxtaposition with the well-worn anecdotes can often seem tenuous at best.  However, out of this haze are at least two images of China’s former Chairman clear; Mao Zedong certainly played a major role in events that can only be described as disastrous and/or cruel and inhumane; however, he also remains one of those most widely recognized and influential leaders in not just China’s very long history, but within a global context as well.  To the extent that these two images of Mao are almost universally accepted, the degree to how atrocious some of his actions might have been or how ingenious some of his military tactics or political thought might be perceived—efforts to quantify, to make tangible, Mao’s legacy are to a certain extent trivial in the grand context of not only China’s extensive development but also what has been a turbulent history of humankind.

The Development of a Leader

            Very rarely do all of the proper elements align to create the kind of transitory state that allowed Mao to take such a prominent role in recent history.  Born in 1893 to the son of a wealthy peasant in the Chinese interior (Terrill 31-32), Mao’s relationship with his father was often tumultuous (Terrill 35).  Gifted with a thirst for literature, Mao quickly developed antagonism for the Confucian classics that were the core of a traditional Chinese education.  And in line with his distaste for the classics, he channeled his hatred towards those men, particularly his father and teachers, who possessed the authority and power to force him to nevertheless study what he so loathed (Terrill 36).  With feelings of antipathy for these traditional ideas, Mao learned to oppose his father’s wishes and actions, especially his avarice in the face of needy neighbors.  When poor peasants once broke into his family’s home, Mao later reminisced, “I thought it was a good thing…because they stole things which they did not have”(Terrill 39).  Therefore, as a young, precocious and impressionable child, the status quo of Mao’s childhood home at Music Mountain sewed the seeds of rebellion that would shape an entire country. 

            This ambitious, young Mao was born into a truly unique and opportunistic period in Chinese history.  By the time of the 20^th century, China’s once infallible image of itself had been diminished by centuries of arguably detrimental western interference, decades of debilitating wars, and the humiliating treaties that followed, and a declining Qing dynasty unable to change and grow with the increasingly difficult times (New History 232-234).  Therefore as Mao grew into maturity at age eighteen and began to experience life outside of his childhood home, the Chinese government, the Qing Dynasty that had ruled for nearly three centuries, collapsed and created a power vacuum within China (New History 242). 

            Within this exceptional period of relative anarchy and chaos of the Chinese political scene, those seeds of rebellion flourished into unbridled ambition and allowed Mao to seek out and find his place in discovering China’s new direction.  From humble beginnings as an assistant librarian at Peking University (Terrill 67) to his early workings in the forming of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Shanghai (Terrill 82) and later his integral involvement with the Guomindang in the context of the United Fronts (New History 279-283), all the way to the fomenting of his legendary status by way of the “Long March” (New History 305-307), Mao leveraged his innate talents with his ideas from his development as a young activists and seized the opportunity granted by history to rise to the very top of China’s new political regime.

Hits and Misses: Hits

            Over the course of almost thirty years, 1949-1976, the now Chairman Mao strove to revolutionize China into a country capable of once again taking its proud stance on the world scene.  Some of his most notable accomplishments include the successful unification of the Chinese mainland, modernization and liberalization of China’s traditional societal values and systems, and the re-birth of Chinese pride (Terrill 464-465). 

            From a country that had fallen into anarchy, divided between regional warlords, the Guomindang, and imperial powers, Mao deftly unified the Chinese mainland under the CCP at Beijing—a formidable task in a country where the geography and the cultures and languages are as varied as the number of inhabitants.  This accomplishment is so great that Ross Terrill writes:

As a unifier he ranks with great emperors of the Sui (Sui Wendi), Tang (Tang Taizong), Han (Han Gaozu), and Ming dynasties (the Hong Wu emperor).  Even with his hero with the whirlwind dictator Qin Shihuang, who knocked China into shape 221 years before the birth of Jesus (Terrill 461).

Through a combination of military strategy, domestic political maneuvering, and adept foreign policy, Mao was able to achieve in less than a quarter of a century what no emperor or dynasty had achieved in three thousand years: he unified China’s vast territories, including Tibet, under a strong central authority and brought order to the chaos that had so divided the country.

With authority over such a vast territory also came the opportunity and the requirement of organizing a capable administration that could deliver where so many previous governments had failed, and Mao delivered.  The Chinese people did not reject Mao’s authority in large part because his ascension to the national leadership provided hope that China would change for the better.  Before Mao, Chinese woman were shackled by the will of the closest male relative.  Drug dependency was rampant, as much as a fifth of the population was addicted to opium.  Factory workers lacked mobility and freedom; workers were even locked in their factories overnight.  The lack of an effective and accessible sanitary and healthcare system meant that millions of Chinese died every year from otherwise preventable diseases (ACP 1-2).  Mao’s regime made great strides towards improving the well being of the Chinese populace.  The Marriage Law of 1950 went to great lengths towards the emancipation of women; infanticide and the commercial trade of babies were outlawed.  By the time of his death, literacy across the nation grew as high as 80%.  Life expectancy more than doubled from 32 to 65 years (ACP 2-3).  Land reform returned China’s resources to its inhabitants (Kristof 5).  Major improvements and modernizations in Chinese society like these led Terrill to argue that Mao “outweighs the Han, Sui, Tang, and Ming emperors” (Terrill 461).  Mao’s revolution achieved more than just a new political paradigm; it initiated a new social paradigm as well—one that greatly improved the quality of life for hundreds of millions of Chinese. 

Mao accomplished more than just providing for the physical well being of his populace, he also fed the soul by restoring the pride of the Chinese nation.  Even as he struggled to lead his followers to victory in the civil war against the Guomindang, Mao was still able to rally the masses in a war of resistance against the Japanese (New History 319).  By some accounts, his communist army staged the only real, organized resistance as the Guomindang was more focused on fighting a civil war (Waldron 32).  Following his success against the Japanese, Mao took a strong stance towards the world’s only two remaining superpowers.  In 1950, he asserted China’s new determination to defend its interests by plunging into the Korean War against the Americans (New History 348).  And by the mid 1960s, Mao had even severed ties with the Soviet Union, the country to which it was supposed to be ideologically linked (New History 396-397).  Just as the United States had marked its ascension as a major power with the sailing of the Great White Fleet, China marked its arrival with a test of a nuclear weapon in 1964 (Terrill 318).  The effect of what was seemingly so much militarization in less than twenty years of Mao’s leadership was to greatly bolster the pride of the Chinese nation and to undo the damage of the unequal treaties.  In this sense, Mao liberated the whole of the Chinese people. 

Hits and Misses: Misses

            For all of his successes and acts of liberation, Mao was also well acquainted with failure and tyranny.  Unlike his accomplishments, Mao’s great failures and examples of terrible crimes against humanity stand out in more than a handful of well documented events: the Hundred Flowers Campaign, the Anti-Rightist Campaign, the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution.  The lasting impression that these great catastrophes and reigns of terror leave is that while Mao pursued and spoke of great visions, he often times failed to successfully implement and sometimes fell out of touch with reality (Terrill 465). 

            The Hundred Flowers Campaign was initiated by the CCP in 1956 on the premise of improving the bureaucracy but ended in a crackdown that led to the Anti-Rightist Campaign in 1957.  The Hundred Flowers Campaign was supposed to foster a healthy criticism of the young and inexperienced CCP but quickly evolved into a trap for intellectuals (Chan 98).  After less than a year and really only five weeks of real criticism, the party abruptly ended the program and instead launched the Anti-Rightist Campaign to “rectify” the number of intellectuals who had expressed their disenchantment with the government.  Mao was shocked by the scope and magnitude of the criticism heaped upon what was fundamentally his policies.  Therefore, the Anti-Rightist Campaign targeted between 300,000 and 700,000 individuals who were deemed to be “rightist” and therefore enemies of Beijing, enemies of the people.  The effect of these campaigns was to demonstrate that dissension against Mao’s programs and philosophies would not be tolerated (New History 364-365). 

            The Great Leap Forward was supposed to revolutionize agricultural and rural industry in much the same way Mao had revolutionized the political structure, but it ended with the untimely death of tens of millions of peasants by starvation.  Begun in 1958, Mao launched the program after becoming anxious with the slow growth of economic development.  His response was to mobilize the peasantry to work harder by invigorating them with a sense of revolutionary fervor.  Peasants worked around the clock to pull more out of the land and even established a great number of small-scale industry such as backyard iron furnaces.  However, while the peasants were indeed mobilized, the government was less organized, especially when it came to statistics.  The result of a bad crop and over reporting by local authorities led to a famine like the world had never seen, between 20 and 30 million peasants died in the countryside as life went on as usual in the cities.  The overwhelming failure of the program demonstrated in a big way for the first time that Mao Zedong was indeed fallible (New History 368-373). 

            A revolutionary at heart, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution ostensibly to further China’s movement towards a true, communist utopia, but instead, he almost ruined that society he sought to transform.  In his last decade, Mao believed that the party he had been so active in cultivating, the CCP, was becoming complacent and was moving away from the communist, Maoist values in which he was such a fervent believer.  Therefore, he enlisted the help of students all across the nation to rebel against the “four olds,” and against almost anyone who had been active in promulgating the old and new status quos: friends, parents, teachers, and of course CCP officials.  The result was that China was nearly thrust into complete anarchy.  Peasants starved, intellectuals were humiliated, local governments were ransacked, and almost anyone was a target for assault—mental, physical, or both.  Even China’s foreign relations suffered as young zealots attempted to continue the revolution abroad.  Mao had made a daring attempt to completely overhaul, fundamentally, Chinese civilization.  But he failed, and a restoration of order cost Mao nearly all of the political capital that remained to him.  With Mao’s fallibility having been demonstrated during the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution went a step further and brought Mao’s sanity into question.  By 1976, he must have been exhausted, as he died in September of that year (New History 383-405). 

Historical Evaluation

            There is no way to truly understand Mao, his motives, beliefs, and actions without becoming Mao himself, nevertheless many individuals and organizations have made valiant attempts.  One of most recent efforts includes an extensive work by husband and wife pair Jung Chang and Jon Halliday entitled Mao: The Unknown Story.  Chang and Halliday’s work paints one of the worst pictures of Mao to date.  They argue that he despised peasants and workers, needlessly sacrificed soldiers, poisoned rivals, exploited the masses, was an incompetent military commander, and even deliberately starved peasants (Chan 98).  The image they paint is no better than how most people view Hitler or Stalin (Kristoff 1).  However, the absolute verity of such heinous accusations as asserted by Chang and Halliday is difficult to establish.  In many cases their sources are shady at best including anecdotal evidence from a 97-year-old villager (Nathan 3) or a reliance on Soviet archives—a nation, which was ultimately very antagonistic towards Mao (Walder 35).  In many ways such a scathing portrait of Mao Zedong comes off as being a little one-dimensional and full of “too much hate, [and] too little understanding” (McLynn 6).  In fact, Chang and Halliday’s work is so passionately against Mao that some reviewers wondered if they were not motivated by personal and political motives (Nathan 4).  However, therein sandwiched between all of this biasness and passion lies the real quandary that evolves when attempting to evaluate Mao Zedong—it is impossible to talk or write about Mao, a leader who left such an enormous impact, without forming an opinion either positive or negative.  Neutrality is therefore at best difficult to observe. 

Any attempts to write as if possessing some sort of first person knowledge of Mao is erroneous; one can not claim to understand him simply from what he said or did.  Words can be misleading and actions can have unforeseen consequences.  However, although misleading or unforeseen, words are weighty and consequences nevertheless have a great impact and an even greater one when they come from the hand of the leader of the world’s most populous nation.  Therefore, one cannot forget Mao’s failures or his weaknesses.  He was not infallible.  And even if his intentions were good, even if he did not mean to hurt so many people, he did.  But he also achieved so much: “How could such an angel of death who brought about so much suffering and destruction, still maintain the respect of so many of his people even 30 years after his death?” (Chan 103).  The answer is that he could not maintain that respect if he had been the worst of the worst of leaders.  He, like any person, had his low points and high points.  However, since he was no ordinary person, efforts have been made to quantify his failures versus his successes, and an approximation of 30% good and 70% bad does not seem so far fetched.

Concluding Thoughts

In spite of the inevitable prejudices harbored and projected by authors such as Chang and Halliday or John Fairbanks or Edgar Snow, some points should be clear regardless of who is putting ink to paper.  Chairman Mao was a talented individual sculpted by a challenging upbringing, who was born into a truly unique period in Chinese history.  So many elements and factors and perhaps sheer acts of luck combined to make Mao what he became.  His upbringing in Music Mountain in the family of his avarice father undoubtedly helped to shape his ideologies and form his passion for revolution.  The complete collapse of the imperial dynasty provided him the vacuum in which he could rise to power.  The continual interference of foreign powers like the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States created situations from which Mao could leverage support.  Therefore, from this extraordinary set of inputs, out came an extraordinary individual, Mao.

The attachment of the word “extraordinary” to Mao’s legacy, however, is not meant to negate the many compelling examples of his atrocities, but simply to describe this man who was so different, so appropriate for his time.  Inarguably Mao committed atrocities and egregious crimes against humanity.  His leadership certainly led to the untimely death of tens of millions of Chinese; he probably ordered the torture and terrorism of tens of thousands of individuals if not more.  But powerful leaders do not rise from a system of relative anarchy to touch the face of gods by being complacent and obsequious.  Such individuals must necessarily possess some sort of drive and tenacity and willingness to take great chances in order to achieve magnificence.  This was the case with Mao.  Had he been born in Germany, in a democratic government with established norms and principles, and still emerged and performed the way he did, then maybe he would deserve the harshest criticisms that history could levy.  However, he was not born into such a society.  He was born into this unique period, which saw the collapse of an imperial system of government that had lasted for more than two millennia.  He was born into this unique period in which China was dominated and manipulated by foreign powers.  He was surrounded by a society that did not have a western understanding of democracy, individual rights, or fairness.  He was surrounded by a culture that was fundamentally different from the West, and therefore he cannot and should not be judged on the same plane as Hitler or Stalin. 

The legacy of Mao is still recent, and indeed his face is still omnipresent throughout China.  This freshness combined with his great impact means that an examination of his legacy will be exceptionally provocative and often emotional.  However, in the course of China’s very long history, Mao’s rule is but a dot—any one person’s life, in the context of humanity is ultimately somewhat trifling—granted Mao’s mark might always be remembered as a little larger than the rest of ours. 

SAJ

—

Annual employment for the United States averaged 8,149,000 individuals for the year of 2004 or 5.5% of the total, working population.[1]  The nation’s trade deficit with the People’s Republic of China reached an all time high at just under 162 billion US dollars.[2]  To an educated, neutral observer, these numbers are not startling; in fact, these statistics demonstrate a mostly healthy American economy and an improving world economy led by China, the world’s largest, fastest developing country.  However to a struggling, middle class American, these numbers represent everything that is wrong with the nation’s current trade policies.  When they see these statistics they cannot help but wonder if those unemployed people lost their jobs to some other country’s workers, particularly China’s.  These struggling Americans, the backbone of the voting population, want to know that free trade with large markets like China is not facilitating the export of their livelihoods abroad. 

The promises that free trade made.

            After the end of WWII and up until the early 1970s, China hardly participated in any type of global economy.  Instead, it pursued the ideas of Mao Zedong and his totalitarian, centrally planned economy.  It isolated itself from almost the entire world, even the U.S.S.R.  However, beginning in the late 1970s, China, under Deng Xiaoping began to look at the world in a whole new way.  It saw world integration as a way to expand its economy by importing new ideas and technology and export its labor advantage.  For the past thirty years, China’s new market economy with social aspects has enjoyed tremendous growth.  In 1986 it began to petition the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) organization for membership.  However, its petitions fell on the desks of stubborn politicans, and it never gained membership.  The single largest impediment to China’s ascension was the United States which wanted China to promise to open up more of its economy than it was offering.  Not until the late 1990s with the World Trade Organization (WTO), the successor to GATT, did China finally start to agree to the US’s demands.  Therefore, the US began to contemplate establishing Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with China versus having to recertify the country year after year.  The process of recertification always resulted in recertification, but it served as a venue to voice opposition to trade with China.  PNTR with China would finally grant normal trade relations with China and lay the foundation for its membership in the WTO[3].

At the close of the twentieth century, As the WTO began to deliberate allowing China to enter its free trade organization, US President Bill Clinton urged Congress not to allow Americans to lose out on this historic opportunity to open up new markets and policy opportunities.  He argued that opening trade to China would allow American companies to sell more goods, provide more jobs, and facilitate China’s integration into a new, global society with increasingly similar views with America on human rights and democracy[4]:

China—with more than a billion people—is home to the largest potential market in the world…If Congress makes the right decision, our companies will be able to sell and distribute products in China made by American workers on American soil, without being forced to relocate manufacturing to China…We will be able to export products without exporting jobs…But this decision is about much more than our economy.  It’s about our values, our security, and the kind of world we want to build.[5]

The Clinton Whitehouse saw granting PNTR to China as an investment in a new lane for US exports.  Citing that US markets were mostly already open to Chinese imports, the administration suggested that US manufacturers would benefit the most from normalizing trade relations.  At the time it enticed legislators by putting forth government, industry, and even independent studies demonstrating overall gains in exports.  The United States Drug Administration prepared an estimate demonstrating that a WTO China would result in at least $2 billion annually in US agriculture exports.  The US investment banking firm Goldman Sachs suggested that US exports to China alone could rise by nearly $14 billion USD by 2005[6]. 

The Administration and its supporters keenly pointed out that an increase in exports would also lead to benefits for American laborers.  The largest benefits in PNTR and WTO membership for China would be the result of the new access to China’s vast markets.  With new access, American companies would need more capacity and more logistical support than before.  The result of this new need would be more jobs.  Furthermore, PNTR with China represented more than just tangible gains in money and jobs.[7]

            The Clinton Administration also appealed to the humanitarian side of American voters by suggesting that economic and trade agreements would be closely linked to social and political reform.  To support these assertions, the administration highlighted history as an example, citing that China’s most oppressive periods had occurred during its times of isolationism such as the era under Mao Zedong.  However, since the introduction of international trade, the government had made steps towards liberalizing not only its economy but also its social and political policies.  Furthermore, normalizing trade relations demonstrates China’s willingness to engage foreign countries.  The administration suggested that WTO membership and PNTR with China would open the country to global forces which would inevitably lead to more dialogue and more liberalization.[8]

            While the White House and its supporters focused more on the benefits to American exports, other organizations recognized that imports from China would also increase but that this increase would benefit all Americans.  These benefits included a better selection of goods and services because more competitors enter the American marketplace.  Because the market can only support so many competitors, only those suppliers that have the best products would be able to market their products; the result leading to higher quality products at lower prices—lower prices posing the greatest benefits to all Americans because it translates into a higher real wage and a higher standard of living.[9]

            By mid 2000, the arguments for Free Trade seemed to resonate well with legislators and their constituents.  In the House of the US Congress, supporters reaffirmed the White House’s assertions that free trade would open up China’s vast markets to American companies and their employees.  However, the opposition targeted China’s human rights record as a key point of contention suggesting that PNTR would only seem as a reward for the Communist regime.  However, the benefits counted more than the potential drawbacks and the House voted 237 to 197 in favor of PNTR with China[10].  When the bill made it to the Senate, opposition legislators tried to impede it by proposing amendments which could introduce sanctions or conditions.  However, while some senators feared that the proposed benefits were more pandering than substance, the Senate voted 83-15 in favor on September 19, 2000, and the stage was set for a new era of world trade[11].  President Bill Clinton signed the legislation into law in early October, and fourteen months later on December 11, 2001, China joined the WTO[12].

The numbers speak out.

            Judging solely by the numbers, all of the White House’s promises and big business’ expectations have not panned out completely as hoped.  Between 1994 and 2000, exports and imports with China grew at a steady rate.  As talks over normalizing trade relations in China began in 2000 and dragged into 2001, trade leveled as a result of lingering uncertainty.  However, as soon as the US normalized trade relations, and China ascended into the WTO, trade began to grow at over twice the pre-normalization rates[13]. 

By some measures, the Clinton White House’s forecasts did come to fruition: Between 2000 and 2005[14], exports have increased by nearly $14 billion in line with Goldman Sachs’s study—and imports during the same period have increased by over $100[15] billion.  In fact, U.S. exports to China have experienced growth rates exceeding 20% per year since 2001.  Meanwhile, imports from China have grown even faster with annual growth rates nearing 30%.  The disparity between the increase in imports over exports leads to a deficit that is growing at approximately 31% per year.  This explosive rise in trade is good and bad.  Any rise in U.S. exports indicates that American companies are selling more goods and services to China.  Conversely, the data also demonstrates that exports, and subsequently the U.S.—China trade deficit, is growing faster than imports, leading the free trade opposition group to cry foul.  However, when this data is put into comparison with the total trade deficit, the numbers are more forgiving.

While the U.S.—China trade deficit has increased numerically, as a percentage of the total deficit, it has only increased by 4% between 1994 and 2004.  This data demonstrates that while imports from China have increased substantially, imports from other Asian trading partners have decreased; U.S. customers have shifted purchases to China.  Therefore, the overall, macroeconomic picture illustrates a situation in which China has simply overtaken other Asian trading nations as the U.S.’s largest deficit partner[16].

            The data looks even better for the job situation in the U.S.  Between 1994 and 2004, the unemployment rate closely mirrored cyclical economic unemployment with no significant correlation with rise in the U.S.—China trade deficit[17].  The nation’s unemployment rate steadily fell between 1994 and 2000 as the U.S. economy expanded; however, it increased between 2000 and 2003 as the economy retracted, but decreased again in 2004 as the economy began to recover[18].

For free trade supporters, the news only gets better.  A special 2004 survey conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor found that less than 2%of total job loss could be attributed to outsourcing.  Conversely, in the manufacturing sector, 65% of those losses were attributed to outsourcing[19].  However, taking into account the health of the total employment market, between 2001 and 2004, the U.S. economy created nearly 2.4 million new non-agricultural jobs while the total workforce population increased by nearly the same number[20].

            A small impact on the labor market and increasing exports numbers are not surprising given survey data from over 345 companies with US—China trade ties.  The majority of US companies working in China state their primary goal is to produce goods or services locally in China to sell within the Chinese market.  Less than 15% of respondents disclosed that they sought to produce goods locally in China for export to the United States.  Steady growth in U.S. exports to China can be attributed to the 11% of respondents whose goods did not originate in China but were intended for the Chinese market[21].

This 11% of respondents who intended to export goods or services from the US to China is the most important to demonstrate a direct effect on jobs in the US.  Fortunately, their existence in contrast with companies importing products to the US helps to keep jobs from going overseas.

The view from middle America.

            The 2004 study by the Department of Labor came as a surprise to many if not most Americans.  With so much media coverage about local manufacturing plants closing and of the personal interest stories of middle class Americans losing out due to globalization, many expected that a large percentage of job loss was directly associated with offshore outsourcing.   The results of this government survey should and can be qualified.  The survey only studied mass layoffs involving 50 ore more workers and only at companies hiring 50 or more workers; the result is that many small business were overlooked[22], small businesses that could account for more actual losses than the survey found.

            Unions in the US like the AFL-CIO contend that hundreds of thousands of jobs ranging from manufacturing to highly skilled computer jobs have been shipped overseas.  However, while these organizations make such bold statements, they agree that “no one knows for sure how many jobs are being shipped overseas, primarily because the government neither collects this information nor requires companies to disclose it…[23]”  These statements ignore recent studies like the 2004 study by the Department of Labor.  A Washington think tank, the CATO Institute, provides another explanation to demonstrate that few jobs are actually hurt by increased imports or exporting off shores.  Using data from the 1999 Economic Report of the President, the Institute found that between 1983 and 1998, jobs and import volumes actually grew together, demonstrating a statistical correlation of .89 since 1991.  The explanation for this correlation is that as Americans grew more affluent from new and better jobs, they demanded more goods and services both from domestic and foreign markets[24]. 

            Despite the correlation between job creation and import volumes, jobs inevitably are destroyed or created over time.  However, data demonstrates that most non-farm workers in the US are employed in non trade sensitive areas.  Approximately 75% of the wage-earning workforce is employed in the relatively non-tradable services sector.  About 10% of the workforce finds employment in the highly tradable goods-producing sectors, but of this group about 20% work in construction which by its definition is localized and not tradable[25].  These figures indicate that broadly speaking, about 85% of the US workforce labors in sectors relatively shielded from foreign competition.

            Data demonstrates that technology and productivity gains have led to more displaced workers than competition from foreign imports.  Former US Federal Reserve Board chairman Alan Greenspan sums up the connection between the current urge by some to seek protectionism and past efforts to thwart technology innovation:

While major advances in standards of living are evident among virtually all nations that have opened their borders to increased competition, the adjustment trauma has also distressed those who once thrived in industries that were then at the cutting edge of technology, but which have since become increasingly noncompetitive.  Economists will say that workers should move from the steel districts of western Pennsylvania to a vibrant Silicon Valley.  And eventually they, or more likely, their children, will.  But the adjustment process is wrenching to an existing workforce made redundant largely through no fault of their own…Yet the protectionist propensity to thwart the process of the competitive flow of capital, from failing technologies to the more productive, is unwise and surely self-defeating.  History tells us that not only is it unwise to try to hold back innovations, it is also not possible over the longer run…From the Luddites[26] to the Smoots and the Hawleys, competitive forces were under attack.  In the end they did not prevail and long-term advances in standards of living resumed[27].

The US Federal government provides assistance to help workers displaced as a result of import competition since the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.  The North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1993 also includes a provision to provide federal assistance to displaced workers.  Between 1994 and 1998 some 564,968 American workers were entitled for compensation under the provision but only some 25% of those eligible workers actually received any kind of assistance[28].  The US Census Bureau found that few import-displaced workers sought aid because by the time they were contacted, between one month and three years after the initial job loss, over 60% of workers had found new employment.  However, the Census Bureau also found that over 60% of displaced workers experienced a decrease in earnings[29].  Furthermore, a 2004 study by the US Bureau of Labor and Statistics found that outsourcing accounted for only 1.5% of productivity gains since 1995.  The study concluded that the gains must have come from advances in technology, management controls, or other developments stemming from the New Economy Paradigm that asserts that permanently higher productivity gains could have resulted from a fundamental change in the economy[30]. 

The macroeconomist’s view.

            The bigger perceived problem with a ballooning trade deficit with China, with all of the US’s trading partners, is the idea that the deficit can only get so big before something terrible happens to the US economy.  Over a ten year period between 1994 and 2004, the total trade deficit has grown from just under $2 billion USD to just over $7 billion USD[31].  These numbers are a sticky issue in Washington where so many more exports than imports create pressure for legislators to enact protectionist legislation.  However, most economists agree that the deficit can only get so high before automatic market mechanisms force it to go down. 

Introductory economics demonstrate the relationship between budget deficits and trade deficits.  As a country’s budget deficit rises, in this case the US’s deficit, the equilibrium interest rate increases as determined by the monetary authority, the US Federal Reserve.  Consequently, interest bearing-assets in the US like treasury bonds will become more attractive relative to other foreign substitutes.  Therefore, foreigners purchase more American bonds and assets while Americans purchase fewer foreign bonds and assets causing less and less US currency to circulate in the world market thus increasing its value.  Eventually US goods become too expensive for foreigners due to the value of the dollar and the tide begins to shift.  Americans purchase more foreign goods because they’re relatively cheaper and foreigners purchase fewer American goods.  More US currency is circulated on foreign markets decreasing its value[32].  Currently, the US economy is at this stage in the macroeconomic cycle.  Americans are purchasing a great deal of foreign goods causing substantial amounts of US currency to be circulated abroad.  However, the market must ultimately correct itself when the value of the dollar begins to fall due to excess supply, and foreigners begin to purchase more American goods[33].

There becomes a point in real world application where theory fails to solve the problems.  Two artificial factors are preventing automatic market forces from correcting the current US—China trade deficit: the Peoples Bank of China (PBoC) and the Yuan-Dollar peg.  Currently the PBoC is the largest purchaser of US Dollars.  As long as the PBoC purchases US dollars, the dollar cannot devalue because the actual volume in public circulation is kept artificially low by the PBoC hording those dollars in reserves.  If the dollar cannot devalue relative to the Chinese Yuan, then Chinese goods and services remain cheap to Americans.  The same theory is applicable to the peg between the Yuan and the Dollar.  As long as the Chinese government maintains the Yuan at 8.22 to one US Dollar, Chinese goods and services remain relatively cheap[34].                    

Just because Chinese goods and services remain cheap doesn’t mean that they are the primary cause of the US’s deficit woes.  The deficit with China still only accounts for approximately 24% of the total deficit, and this deficit is comprised of goods that most rich nations prefer not to make like textiles, toys, and sporting goods.  The US economy would be affected much more if a rich nation like Italy were to artificially devalue its currency and cause products like cars and designer luxury goods to become cheaper—products that would compete head to head with big US manufacturers[35]. 

However the current concern is that one day in the near future China will begin to climb up the economic ladder.  Currently it produces t-shirts and golf clubs, but one day in the next decade it might effectively and efficiently produce airplanes and services[36].  At that point in time, it would compete more directly with wealthy nations like the US.  In fact, some industry groups and unions, like the AFL-CIO already point to evidence of this trend.  A 2004 study by Forrester Research Inc. indicates that white collar jobs are leaving for developing countries like India, China, and Russia at a faster rate than expected[37].  Fortunately, China has already announced currency reforms and now pegs the Yuan to a basket of currencies rather than directly to the US Dollar.

Playing fair.

            Given that Chinese imports into the US are growing faster than US exports to China, the situation becomes increasingly evident that China must conform to the rules and regulations it agreed to in ascending to WTO membership in 2001.  Fortunately, China has been mostly compliant with its obligations to date; however, there are many key issues that it has failed to deliver acceptable results.  In fact, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission gives China mostly bad marks for failure to properly fulfill many of its WTO obligations[38].  Non-sector specific issues of contention include Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), product distribution, and government transparency. 

            According to a survey by the American Chamber of Commerce in China, over two thirds of its members reported that China’s IPR enforcement efforts were ineffectual to date.  The Chinese government has passed many laws but failed to enforce them.  This lack of enforcement poses a severe, competitive disadvantage for many American companies which provide easily distributed products such as media, entertainment, and computer software.  Because enforcement has been lacking, many American companies dealing in these sensitive areas have not become active in the Chinese market contributing to billions of dollars in lost opportunities[39].

            IPR fraud is not only limited to domestic China.  As one of the world’s largest exporter of counterfeit goods, China’s lack of enforcement has also damaged American companies selling goods abroad.  These counterfeit goods range from fake wallets to fake machinery to fake medicines.  To highlight the gravity of this problem, recent reports estimate that between 10 and 15% of over-the-counter medicines sold in China are counterfeit as a result of loopholes that allow Chinese manufacturers to produce and market active chemical ingredients[40].  Given the breadth of the counterfeiting, a danger is posed not only to the multinational companies that market these products but also to the individuals and institutions that sometimes unwittingly purchase them believing them to be genuine articles[41]. 

            IPR infringement is not entirely beyond China’s control.  The American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai provides specific recommendations that include:

·      Provide local authorities with incentives to enforce IPR.

·      Expand enforcement from simple seizures to more thorough investigations of organized counterfeiting networks.

·      Establish new administrative and legal measures that target parties contributing services and materials to counterfeits.

·      Enhance laws and regulations regarding criminal liability, including the severe penalization of fake testimony in court.

·      Enhance the Patent Law to reflect international standards[42].

The Chinese authorities are acutely aware of IPR violations occurring within its borders.  A quick search of Shanghai’s largest English newspaper’s website, the Shanghai Daily, reveals many articles pertaining to IPR enforcement.  Using the query word, “fake” delivers over seventy articles pertaining to searches and seizures conducted by Chinese authorities[43].  However, given the size and depth of the country’s markets, these searches are few and far between and have done little to decrease the fame of the country’s counterfeit markets such as Silk Street Market in Beijing or Xiang Yang Market in Shanghai.  Given China’s lack of urgency in true IPR enforcement, American companies may have to wait until mainland media, entertainment, and software companies are unable to make profits before any solid steps are taken to enforce IPR.

            In accordance with its WTO obligations, China should have provided full distribution rights to foreign companies by December 11, 2004.  American companies have long sought the ability to freely distribute products and services throughout china.  Such ability would serve to make the Chinese market much more accessible.  However, to date, only a handful of companies have succeeded in gaining this ability.  Implementation of distribution rights has been extremely and painfully slow.  The government agency in charge of providing these rights is too understaffed and too bureaucratic too efficiently implement changes.  Not until American companies, foreign companies are able to easily apply for and register for full distribution rights will the Chinese market be completely open to foreign competition[44]. 

            The last major non-sector specific WTO issue relating to China concerns a lack of transparency in government workings.  Improvements have been made in the past with the availability of draft regulations; however, the government still has failed to consult with companies before issuing final regulations.  These regulations can be issued at any time with little to no notice or industry input.  The result is that companies have little ability to prepare for new legislation that could drastically affect its operations[45]. 

            China also possesses less concrete advantages in marketing its products abroad.  While the country enjoys natural advantages such as a large population and abundant labor supply, it also fosters a not so natural advantage: labor abuse.  In early 2004 the AFL-CIO presented a 103 page petition to Congress outlining labor issues that its members had discovered with China.  Key among these issues was a detail description of the working conditions of Chinese peasants and how that condition represents an unfair trade advantage[46]. 

            China’s dwelling and labor system is unique as its “socialist economy with market economy aspects.”  Under the Chinese household registration system, commonly referred to as the hukou system, Chinese society is divided into a rural portion and an urban portion[47].  For those Chinese born in an urban setting, they are able to move about freely in search of higher paying jobs with better benefits and work environment.  However, rural dwellers do not enjoy such freedoms.  Under the current system, a Chinese born into a rural dwelling family must always remain a rural citizen.  In order for them to seek better jobs in the cities, they must first apply for the government’s permission.  Once they have secured housing in the urban environment, they cannot leave that job without paying a substantial penalty which is usually beyond their means.  To make matters worse, these rural workers cannot obtain the same social services as their urban born counterparts.  In essence, the Chinese, rural-born laborer earns less money and is entitled to virtually no rights in his working environment. 

Given that the large majority of China remains rural, this household registration system creates and promotes a kind of cheap labor that is unobtainable if not unimaginable for American companies[48].  Fortunately, the hukou system is being reformed[49].  The national government is beginning to realize, with the help of foreign companies and governments, that a bifurcation of its country into two distinct classes does not foster the kind of harmony that the government has always touted.

Promoting a free and peaceful world.

            Free trade with China would be a hard case to sell to the American public based on economic gains alone, especially when the majority of those gains might be quantified as intangibles benefiting primarily Multinational Corporations (MNC).  For the American voter and for the politicians that represent them, there has to be some other cause which free trade can further, and that cause, or causes in this case, are the American ideals of democracy and human rights—a spreading of western ideals.  However, American politicians were not the only people who recognized the potentials of allying social change with economic prosperity.  The Chinese government also recognized this possibility; they recognized that by joining the WTO and in globalization, they would be joining a party led by the United States, the world’s only superpower.  Joining such a group would possibly yield more influence to the US.  However, Jiang Zemin recognized that globalization could also help China bring in more foreign investment and technology to boost his economy.  Faced with the dilemma of joining globalization or of being left behind, he chose the former[50]. 

            Current economic theories put forth the idea that with globalization often comes social reforms.  One method of achieving reforms lies in the idea of the MNC as the vehicle for those reforms.  With increased globalization and free trade, MNCs are able to allocate resources from richer countries to developing countries.  Their resources allow more disadvantaged people to gain skills and prosperity[51].  With more prosperity comes the wider availability of new technologies such as telephones, fax machines, computers, and the internet. 

These technologies make news and knowledge accessible; news that was formally only relevant to a particular region now becomes relevant to the entire world.  Farmers in China with a TV set can now see how rich people in Britain live.  In fact, the relationship doesn’t even have to be so far removed.  Farmers in China with a TV set can now see how rich people in Shanghai live comfortably and wonder why they do not enjoy the same freedoms and prosperity.  Inquisitive students of university can now access world media sites like CNN and the BBC thanks to the internet[52].  The Chinese government can try to block its people from taking advantage of these new types of technology, but as Alan Greenspan so eloquently expressed, not even the government can fight technological innovation: a simple proxy can allow a somewhat crafty student to bypass the firewalls that block out the free world. 

Even a move, like joining the WTO, that seems primarily aimed at improving economic conditions can bring about social change.  China’s ascension to the WTO is dependent on many factors like improving legal climate and government transparency.  A better legal climate involving clearer laws with fewer loopholes not only helps MNCs do business in China, but it also helps the Chinese.  Whereas they were formally subject to the whims of their local leaders, they now have the laws to look toward for advice.  Transparency in law making not only helps MNCs stay up to date on the government’s actions, but it also helps local Chinese to take a more active role in law making[53]. 

With so much hope for a more open China, one must also recognize that grand schemes such as these hardly happen according to plan.  For example, MNCs have the ability to bring foreign capital into China to improve the living conditions of its people, but they could very well pay the locals less and neglect the environment more.  For example, in Puerto Rico, tuna companies left the US seeking lower wages and more flexible environmental regulations.  Today Puerto Rico is a nation, that despite its close ties with the US, suffers double digit unemployment and a poverty rate nearing 50%[54].  The government can also block technology.  While companies like Google have new found access to the Chinese mainland, they have also reciprocated and provided technology to help the government block out unfavorable content.  The internet is now available to Chinese, but they will not, in many cases, see those stories and events that make them yearn for a different lifestyle or government.  Finally, laws that help MNCs conduct business and better government transparency that helps them fight corruption could do just that: help foreign business.  Singapore for example has been very good at providing a good legal climate for business while still restricting the actions and thoughts of its population[55].

               The climate becomes increasingly evident then that there exists no guarantee that globalization can lead to a more open and free China.  However, there is hope; there is hope in the people themselves.  Those tuna companies that entered Puerto Rico seeking cheaper labor and an environment to pollute were ultimately turned out by increasing wages and intensifying environmental regulations[56].  China can and is taking the same course of action.  The Chinese people can decide that they will not be mistreated and that they will not let their environment suffer for the sake of a MNC’s profits.  Inquisitive Chinese can use proxies to get around internet firewalls and filters.  They can access the sites that let them see how the developed world lives its life, and they can call for change within their country.  The statistical fact that there were over 74,000 demonstrations in the mainland in 2004 demonstrates that the people are not being placated by their government and by a little more money; they want more[57].  They want to live their lives the way that wealthy people in London, New York, and Shanghai do. 

            A country’s people with access to MTV, American inspired television shows like “Supergirl,” and food from McDonalds is less likely to want to go to war.  In fact, no two countries with a McDonalds have ever gone to war[58].  China is the US’s second largest trading partner after Canada with the month of September, 2005 alone seeing totals exceeding $25 billion USD[59].  The same arguments that point to MNCs as profit hungry animals devoid of social conscience can also strengthen the arguments for peace.  Those same MNCs have no interest in seeing their investments destroyed or lost in turmoil and war.  They will lobby governments to ensure that their investments are secure.  Finally, in an age where a laser guided cruise missile can destroy the Three Gorges Dam or Taipei 101, it’s in no government’s interests to choose war over prosperity. 

“One World.  One Dream.”

            Free trade and globalization brings together the world to allow countries to interact among each other to share views and pursue the same dreams.  Shortly after WWII, the newly established United Nations (UN) established the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

a common standard for achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance[60]

Globalization allows countries like China and the United States to share in reaching for the same dreams and visions as articulated by the UN.  Without globalization, Beijing would not be hosting the 2008 Olympic Games.  It is true that free trade can have negative side effects.  It can lead to a loss of manufacturing jobs in developed countries.  It can hamper developing countries’ efforts to grow their farming industries, but in the end, it leads to a higher level of well being for all of the world’s people and the temporary pains that it may create are surely worth the gains.

SAJ

—

As America stood outside of World War Two, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt succinctly summarized the international community’s opinion about Americans: “Americans are admittedly rich, that Americans have considerable industrial power–but that Americans are soft and decadent, that they cannot and will not unite and work and fight.”  The United States’ considerable success and victory in W.W.II demonstrated to the world that indeed Americans could unite behind a common cause to assist their suffering comrades.  Through the skillful use of that military might and with the support of a world united behind one cause, America emerged from W.W.II supremely powerful and greatly admired by the nations that it had liberated.  With such great power and admiration, a greater burden befell America to wield its power to protect its people and uphold its ideals around the world while also maintaining its status of prestige as a nation of goodwill.  Now, with the destruction of the World Trade Towers in New York City, America faces one of the most difficult challenges to maintaining this delicate balance between world opinion and the full-scale use of its tremendous military capability.  I am not questioning whether America should or should not wage war on Iraq, rather I want to explore Americans’ depth of understanding of war, and I want to analyze the reasons for the lack of world support.  I question first if Americans realize the true horrors of a massive war to overthrow a regime, and if they do, how can America act for its protection while also maintaining the support of its allies and world colleagues? 

            Do Americans understand what a massive war against a nation of considerable military capability entails?  I fear that they think that all of the battles in the War on Terrorism can be won through the electronic launch of multimillion-dollar cruise missiles or the deployment of unmanned drones.  This belief alone perplexes and worries traditional allies in Europe and Asia; they hear war and they see death; they sense chaos, and they cringe at the bodily mutilations.  Americans think of gore and chaos, and they envision the gruesome introduction of Saving Private Ryan or the disorder in Black Hawk Down, but those are television wars.  American viewers must know that not even televised, gratuitous violence can capture the true horrors of armed combat?  Why else would Dave Jensen and Lee Strunk in Tim O’Brien’s The Things They Carried create a pact to promise to end the other friend’s life if he has suffered a mutilation?  Do Americans today remember the draft of the Vietnam War or the pardon granted to draft dodgers by President Carter?  Certainly, no one under the age of thirty-five remembers, and if he did, he wouldn’t have been eligible for that displeasure anyway.  Do Americans realize that the soldiers entering the perils of combat are the fathers, mothers, husbands, wives, sons, and daughters of families who care for their safety?  Have voters read Wilfred Owen’s “Dulce et Decorum Est” where he proclaims, “My friend, you [who are in favor of war] would not tell with such high zest / To children ardent for some desperate glory, / The old Lie: Dulce et decorum est / Pro patria mori?”  Admittedly, Owen is European and writing about World War One, and this war on Iraq won’t be so intensive, so long, so terrible, or will it?  The United States has assumed an easy victory in conflicts before; take Vietnam and Korea for example.  I argue that if Americans could know or could remember the horrors of war, they, like those nations less zealous to rise to arms, would not be so eager for the death of so many sons and daughters of American, British, and Iraqi citizens.  If Americans realized these horrors that beleaguers their international colleagues, then perhaps this greater, mutual understanding would strengthen the War on Terrorism. 

            Why aren’t America’s natural allies lining up to support action against this common threat?  Why are these allies forcing America to be so diligent in its path of action?  The operatives of Al-Qaeda have exposed Americans to true terror, and now Americans must know the truth about modern American foreign policy as well.  Anti-Americanism is not simply a consequence of the fact that citizens of the United States enjoy considerable wealth and freedom; it comes as the result that this nation represents just five percent of the Earth’s population while consuming a vast portion of its resources.  The new belief among Europeans is that Americans are considerably wealthy, possess a great amount of industrial capability, but come off as exceptionally arrogant; they find it hard to rally behind a country that believes it can overthrow another nation’s government at its pleasure.  Furthermore, I think that Americans will find that the Europeans, well-versed in the horrors of war in their own backyards, are not so eager to relive and touch the horrors and casualties of what seems so forgettable and intangible to so many Americans: war.  Europeans, like the Germans and their newly reelected anti-American Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, do not want to pay this price only to act as the puppet of American imperialism. 

            What is this imperialism that hinders support of American action?  Americans should ask themselves how they would react if another nation, France, kept a carrier group in the Chesapeake bay so that it could bomb Washington D.C. every other week to impair America’s ability to defend itself.  Naturally, the accidental death of American tourists and schoolchildren would be a regrettable result of the necessary French action.  I believe that our allies in NATO might truly value all human life, regardless of nationality.  The Europeans might take into consideration the hundreds of thousands of Iraqis already murdered, mutilated, or mentally wrecked by Western military aggression.  They probably consider the fact that ordinary Iraqi citizens, like any human beings, simply want to have the inalienable right to live their lives in peace.  America will lose its admirable position as a nation serving the universal greater good if it acts without considering these truths understood by its colleagues.  America will be perceived as an understandably powerful country blinded by arrogance in its single-minded attack on other nations weaker than itself.  America’s actions must be in accordance with the beliefs of its allies if it wishes to maintain their support.

            America is a great nation.  No other military in the world can respond to any threat around the globe in eight hours, nor does any other nation’s people enjoy such a comfortable lifestyle.  However, if we, Americans, continue to contend that terrorism exists as a threat to all people in all countries, then as a nation so deeply rooted in the ideals of democracy, our 280 million-people minority cannot act without the support of the earth’s other six billion-inhabitants majority.  I maintain that contrary to President Bush, the rest of the international community’s opinion remains vitally important; we cannot act alone.  Continual use of unilateral action without the support of our colleagues will only serve to damage that prestige that came with our dignified use of power in W.W.II.  The rest of the world is not eager to call its people to arms, and other governments are weary of a country that continually strikes out against weaker nations.  Let our elected officials cease with the “forty-thousand tons of diplomacy, take a short drive to New York City and join our world colleagues in mutual, united discussion on terrorism.  This issue affects us all; only through the united support of our allies and our colleagues combined with the power of our military and our demonstrated will, can America overcome this new form of hatred that afflicts the world.   

The following memo was written for two political science classes at Rice: one on Mid-East Politics and another on the science behind U.S. foreign policy.  The version below was ultimately adapted for the latter. 

SAJ

–

            Since the discovery of marketable oil on the Arabian Peninsula in 1938, the United States’s foreign policy towards the Middle East has focused on enabling authoritarian regimes in order to secure a cheap and reliable source of oil.[1]  Tragically, that policy made a catastrophic demonstration of failure in the terrorist attacks in 2001.  With several thousand American casualties and the exposure of national security vulnerabilities, American citizens were anxious and demanded action; the audience cost for the current administration was very high. Therefore, with the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Washington turned its satellites towards Iraq.   An adversary since the Persian Gulf War, Iraq posed new risks as a supplier of weapons to insurgents in Afghanistan and terrorists around the world.  However, the world’s tears for America’s sorrow had greatly dried and most developed nations did not support action in Iraq.  The U.S. acted in spite of world opposition, citing legal definitions and international norms as its supporters.  However, such strong opposition nevertheless forced U.S. policy makers to precisely and persuasively identify a legitimate case for intervention. 

Definition of Sovereignty is Confounded

            The idea of sovereignty provided a key point of contention against an Iraqi invasion.  First articulated in the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, sovereignty has traditionally granted all powers of a state to its constitutionally legitimate ruler[2].  These rulers possessed complete authority to treat their subjects as they saw fit within their own borders; no other state had the right to interfere.[3]  The Concert of Europe and two World Wars have further shaped and characterized Westphalian sovereignty:

First, a sovereign state is one that enjoys supreme political authority and monopoly over the legitimate use of force within its territory.  Second, it is capable of regulating movements across its borders.  Third, it can make its foreign policy choices freely.  Finally, it is recognized by other governments as an independent entity entitled to freedom from external intervention.[4]

This definition of sovereignty has never been formally written into any type of international law, but it provided the basis for world order for several hundred years.  However, the world that Westphalian sovereignty governed was not globally connected as it is today.  That traditional definition is therefore quickly fading in its usefulness.  Before the present move towards globalization, “weapons of mass destruction, genocide, failed states, and rogue states”[5] did not pose the threat to sovereignty that they do today. 

            Absolute and exclusive sovereignty is great locution but not so great in actual practice.[6]  For example, intervention based on humanitarian grounds and integovernmental organizations like the European Union are obvious exceptions to the traditional definition of sovereignty.  Further, the post WWII importance of self determination and minority rights demonstrate the need for a new working definition.[7]  However, with a global community attempting to formulate a global definition comes global disagreement on the values that should comprise the new sovereignty.  For example, Western world leaders might want to make humanitarian intervention a permanent part of the new modern sovereignty, but world leaders cannot agree on what warrants humanitarian intervention. 

            There is currently no institution that has exercised authority in formulating universal parameters for setting forth a definition of sovereignty in the modern era.[8]  Given that no universally accepted definition of sovereignty exists, states are left to themselves to formulate policies of intervention.  The U.S. acted in Iraq as best it could in accordance with its own beliefs; it could not have avoided disagreement on its actions given the different types and varying degree of values held by world governments.

Pursue a Pragmatic Policy of Intervention

            Despite the lack of an internationally accepted definition of sovereignty, states should still not indiscriminately intervene in other state’s affairs.  While the U.S. has beneficially utilized its hegemonic power to foster global stability, it still does not have the legitimate right or the technical capability to intervene anytime or anywhere it chooses.[9]  Intervention is defined as:            

convention-breaking military and/or economic activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority structures of the government with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the government and opposition forces.[10]

The U.S.’s global presence opens it to a wide variety of conflicts and situations in which it could intervene, but its resources are “necessarily limited; there will always be more interest to protect than resources to protect them.”[11]  In juxtaposition with the need to limit intervention, the U.S. must also be careful to refrain from refraining.  If it is too unwilling to intervene in situations where the world perceives a strong need, then this fear could encourage anarchy in the world system, and the U.S. would lose its ability to favorably influence world conditions.[12]  Therefore, the U.S.’s policy must be to neither intervene too much nor too little.

            In an ideal scenario, the U.S. should assume a very pragmatic, tiered policy towards intervention.  First, the situation for intervention must provide itself as a geopolitical interest for U.S. policy.  Secondly, once an issue of national interest has been identified, the voting populous must support the policy.  Third, given that a policy is supported, the interests within the target should openly seek or accept intervention in order to lend legitimacy towards the action.  Geopolitical interests are non-humanitarian by definition.[13]  Examples might include intervention for secure access to oil, limiting arms proliferation, or eliminating illegal drug factories.  When such an interest has been identified, the voting populous must support the intervention.  As a democracy, the U.S. populous more willingly supports intervention when success is likely and the timeframe of intervention is relatively short.[14]  Often in tandem with building domestic support, policy makers should also ensure that their target is actively seeking their support; the target may or may not be a state government.  In an ideal situation of intervention, a state’s government does seek outside help. 

            Often, it is a state’s people who seek outside help against their government.  When such a case exists, the U.S. must closely analyze the source of discontent.  It has the most legitimate case for intervention when a majority of the ruled seek its aid; however, often a minority is being so severely oppressed that morals dictate the necessity for intervention; such a situation poses a very difficult case.  To simplify matters, policy makers should analyze the call from within the target state with less weight.  The other two supporting criteria for intervention have already been met; a geopolitical issue has arisen and the American people support intervention; therefore, pragmatically, policy makers can selectively choose how to portray the target’s request.

            Once a policy for action has been adopted, three factors should then determine whether military intervention is necessary: the intensity of the problem, the existence of non-humanitarian issues, and the availability of military resources and options to handle the conflict.[15]  In determining its strategy, particularly its military strategy, the U.S. must analyze its potential costs and gains from intervention.  The more intense a problem, the more protracted and deadly the conflict is likely to be, meaning high costs.  The existence of non-humanitarian issues means that pragmatic geopolitical issue is at stake.  Lastly, available military resources can minimize costs if they are available and in place. Given the costs of intervention, it should be pointed out that states receive no utility from the act of intervention itself; benefits are only realized at the conflict’s positive resolution. [16]

The Benefits Must Outweigh the Costs

            A model of this scenario includes the costs and the benefits.  The costs, C_i are the sum of the available resources, R, and audience costs, A,—the willingness of the voting population to support the intervention over time.

C_i = ∑ R+∑ A

Given the costs of intervention, total utility can be calculated through two equations.  The first equation, EU_ni, represents the expected utility from the conflict self resolving, or non intervention.  The second equation, EU_i, represents the payout from intervention.

EU_n = q(U_s) + (1-q)(U_c) – ∑ C_ni

EU_i = p(U_sw) + (1-p)(U_f) – ∑ C_i

q represents the probability that the conflict will be resolved without intervention.  U_s represents the utility that the state gains from not intervening whereas U_sw is the utility from intervention.  Finally, U_c represents the utility from continued fighting without intervention and U_f represents the utility from fighting after unsuccessful intervention[17]. 

            Given that in the case of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. must have expected higher utility from intervention than from non intervention.  Unfortunately, opportunities for successful nation building intervention are very rare and depend on four factors.  First, the U.S. must assess how damaging or threatening the offending state is to its own people or to the U.S. and other states.  Secondly, an opportunity must exist for the operation to be successful; for example, the political or social climate must be friendly towards a new government.  Third, the costs to implement a new government should be acceptable.  Lastly, there should exist no other, better alternatives than military intervention.[18]  Applying these constraints on nation building with the previous criteria for intervention, one can analyze past U.S. actions and assess the possibility for future involvement.

            One example of non-intervention is the 1994 Rwandan Civil War.  The genocide of Tutsis at the hand of the Hutus was certainly morally moving but it was the only possible reason for intervention, and it was humanitarian.  No geopolitical, non-humanitarian issue presented itself.  Secondly, the violence was so swift and intense that there existed a high likelihood of U.S. casualties.  Therefore, remembering that no utility is gained from intervention by itself, the high costs of intervening in a violent, protracted conflict outweighed the minimal, pragmatic assessment of humanitarian payoff.  [19]

Intervention in Iraq was with Cause

            Operation Iraqi Freedom presented a very different case from Rwanda.  First, any type of intervention was qualified because a geopolitical interest was at stake, many Americans supported intervention in polls, and multiple factions within Iraq expressed extreme discontent with Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath regime.  With those necessary qualifications, military intervention was also feasible because U.S. armed forces could swiftly and effectively eliminate primary opposition and because other forms of intervention, such as United Nations sanctions, had failed.  Therefore, the U.S. saw intervention acceptable because it met all criteria for successful intervention; however, international legitimacy was perceivably weak.

            As discussed earlier, the U.S. might have considerable trouble building legitimacy behind military interventions based on a demonstrated need from within the country.  In the case of Iraq, it presented two ostensible geopolitical reasons to the world and to the American people.  It asserted that Iraq was a security threat because it manufactured Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and harbored terrorists.  Further, it asserted that the Hussein regime had committed crimes against humanity against its own people.[20]  However, when these reasons failed to appeal to all of the veto holding members of the Security Council, the White House pursued legal arguments stemming from Security Council resolutions 687 and 1441.  SCR687 was adopted prior to the Gulf War and authorized the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait.  Because SCR687 had never been repealed, the U.S. argued that it was still in effect.  Further, because the Security Council later passed SCR1441 finding Iraq in material breach of SCR687, the cease fire outlined by 687 was also no longer in effect.[21]  Therefore, the U.S. had the legitimate right to act on behalf of the Security Council to force Iraq to abide by those resolutions.  As technically correct as the legal argument may have been, it did little to sway support.  Therefore, the U.S. resorted to legal, but more emotionally charged arguments.

            United States policy makers argued that the U.S. had the right to preemptively attack Iraq in anticipatory self defense, a national right.  Specifically, policy makers cited Article 51 of the UN Charter:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.[22]

The ambiguity in the text is “armed attack.”  However, a state could reason “armed attack” in many different lights.  In the case of Iraq, the U.S. interpreted “armed attack” to be synonomous with the potential for armed attack.  While the U.S.’s interpretation might appear to be very loose, other historical contexts support such an reading.  For example, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg ruled that the German invasion of Norway in 1940 was not defensive because it was not necessary to prevent an imminent Allied invasion.  This ruling demonstrates that had the attack been in response to an imminent, Allied invasion, the attack would have been legitimate in the international arena.  It is with such an understanding that the U.S. sought action against Iraq.

            Given this historical support, because of the possibility of the existence of WMDs previous aggression by the Hussein regime in 1991, and its lack of cooperation with current Security Council Resolutions, the U.S. could reasonably claim fear of imminent attack.[23]  With this argument, the U.S. successfully supported all criteria for invasion.  Any objections presented by other nations represented political agendas or differences in agenda inherent in a global world.  The U.S. enjoys its status as the sole world hegemon and other states fear that it could become too comfortable with unilateralism.  However, the U.S. can ameliorate those fears by continuing to contribute global goods, and it is in a unique position to do so given its extraordinary power and influence.  Fortunately, intervention policies that favor the U.S. often also favor other industrialized states.  For example, few states can deny that they seek safety and open economies for trade.[24]  Therefore, because U.S. policies generally lead to more world, public goods, intervention policies should continue with or without initial multilateral support.

            The technical marvel of the case against Iraq lays the foundation for future intervention in the Middle East.  While no WMDs were found in Iraq[25] the greater importance is the potential payoff.  That payoff is a democratic country in the heart of one of the most autocratic areas of the world.  After being able to demonstrate a cause for intervention, the next question deals with the applicability of this process towards other states in the Middle East.

Democratic Intervention Is Beneficial

            The regime change in Iraq has the potential for a sizeable payoff.  With a new friendly government in place, the U.S. can anticipate that there will be little to no government sponsored terrorist activities.  Further, any weapons programs that may have been in progress are now effectively halted.  Rogue states and terrorist will not be able to obtain WMDs from Iraq.  A capitalistic economy in a friendly country translates into a stable oil supply.  Lastly, the deep effects of democracy have the potential for the greatest benefits.  Because the people of Iraq will now be free, the world can expect a much more content and productive population that will contribute to the global culture and economy.  On an inter-state level, democracies are significantly less likely to go to war with each other than non democracies.[26] 

            A global community of democratic states presents significant advantages to the U.S. and other nations.  Research has demonstrated that democracies maintain international agreements better, develop few if any terrorists, and rarely fight each other.[27]  Further, democratic nations often incubate strong, capitalist economies and foster the creation of international organizations.  Democracy along with economic interdependence and under the auspices of the international organizations, leads to a more unified, cooperative world.[28]

            In contrast with the advantages of a policy of intervention and democracy are the potential drawbacks.  The first impediment lies with the U.S. itself; it cannot forcefully seek democratic reforms in every undemocratic nation; its resources would become dangerously dispersed and vulnerable to attack.[29]  As democratic reforms often coincide with economic reforms, the U.S. will find that it is extremely difficult to achieve both objectives simultaneously.  Because unpopular economic reforms often cause social strife, a new democratic government might find itself unable to survive the resulting turmoil.[30]

            This memo supports a U.S. policy of pragmatic intervention for democratization of the Middle East because considerable benefits are at stake.  The benefits are tangible and appealing to the U.S. electorate.  They include increased national security, a more stable economy, and a launch pad from which to inspire and pursue reforms throughout the entire Middle East.  However, the U.S. cannot act to promote democracy indiscriminately or with poor planning.  In order to pursue this policy, the U.S. must continue to carefully choose its target states and support its high level directive to promote democratic reforms.[31] 

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